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Abstract 
This report focuses on aspects of the Boeing-EADS rivalry—in both 
commercial and military markets.  Indeed, the Boeing-EADS relationship is one of 
the major constellations in the international firmament of defense industrial affairs.   
In this report, we discuss the U.S. Air Force selection of the Boeing KC-46 
over the EADS KC-45 in 2011, seeking to understand connections between the 
associated events.  In Chapter II, we also seek to find useful explanatory models for 
Boeing’s success. 
In Chapter III, we consider the narrow-body airliner market—currently a 
Boeing-EADS duopoly.  Narrow-body airliners have been a central to the firms’ 
rivalry, as well as a major source of profits for both.  As such, these narrow-body 
families have provided a resource foundation for a number of wide-body 
developments, some of which have become part of the defense marketplace. 
The narrow-body market has been so profitable that other firms are 
positioning themselves to mount major challenges to the two market incumbents.  
These outlying firms have already made the market, in some sense, more 
competitive.   
If the potential challengers become successful entrants, then Boeing and 
EADS will have lower profits— with potentially major repercussions for both their 
commercial and defense product lines.   
Keywords:  EADS, Boeing, Airbus EADS-Boeing Rivalry, Boeing KC-46, EADS KC-45, KC-
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I.  Introduction 
This report continues an ongoing project aimed at contributing to a better 
understanding of the international defense marketplace—an increasingly complex 
environment.  Our intent has been threefold: to understand current defense industrial 
developments, place those developments in context, and find paradigms suitable for 
better explanation of those ongoing developments.   
Our first report in this series, Echoes Across the Pond: Understanding EU–US 
Defense Industrial Relationships (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2008a), considered three 
current episodes in the transatlantic defense-industrial complexes.  The cases under 
consideration were the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the UK Defence Industrial 
Strategy, and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)–
Airbus1 KC-30 aerial tanker proposal.  We also discussed three well-known 
analytical perspectives as candidates for understanding those cases: offsets in 
international defense trade, transaction cost economics (TCE), and corporate 
strategy models.  In the style of Graham Allison (1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999), we 
essayed explanations of all of our cases using all three paradigms.  We assessed 
the offsets perspective as best for understanding the JSF, TCE for the UK’s Defence 
Industrial Strategy, and corporate strategy models for the EADS-Northrop Grumman 
KC-30 proposal. 
Our second report, New Patterns of Collaboration and Rivalry in the US and 
European Defense and Aerospace Industries (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2008b), 
emphasized defense industrial firms—with consideration of Boeing’s Model 787 
development and production; the KC-45 (or KC-X) competition (through the summer 
of 2008), which involved the EADS-Northrop Grumman alliance and the Boeing 
Company; and European defense firms’ strategies (BAE Systems, EADS, 
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Finmeccanica) for entering the North American defense market through direct 
investment.  Two major themes that emerged were (1) the increasing technical and 
managerial complexity in modern aerospace systems and (2) the increasing power 
of relatively agile defense suppliers relative to their increasingly bureaucratic 
customers. 
Our third report, Global Cooperation and Competition in the Defense and 
Aerospace Industries (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2010), continued inquiries along the 
same general lines of this overall project.  We continued our exploration of the 
international defense industrial “terrain,” and our search for useful paradigms.  The 
KC-X competition (third installment) considered the explanatory power of two views 
of the defense establishment customers in the defense marketplace: the traditional 
model of the sovereign monopsonist versus the governmental politics perspective 
(Model III) offered by Graham 1(1977; Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  We considered the 
remarkable travails of the A-400M military transport development effort—which 
came in very late and much over budget.  The A-400M (military) was a useful 
companion piece to our previous Boeing 787 (commercial).  Both cases illustrate the 
increasing complexity of large, international development projects—and the 
problems that can emerge.  A potentially significant change in the structure of the 
international defense marketplace is the possibly-emerging Nordic defense bloc.  In 
this instance, we found a rather complex situation —with significant attractions to the 
other Nordic states but also close and useful relationships with partners outside  the 
Nordic region (especially the United States). 
Our fourth report, Emerging Patterns in the Global Defense Industry (Franck, 
Lewis, Matthews, Udis, 2011) concerned three topics with the same general aims as 
previously discussed: the ongoing KC-X story, the C-27, and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs).  The prolonged KC-X source selection was clearly not a case of 
delays due to technological immaturity.  The KC-X—whether based on Boeing or 
Airbus designs—is well known, with tanker conversions of the A330 (or A310) and 
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the bureaucratic, legal, and political obstacles to acquisition in the United States – as 
well as their potential for sidetracking the acquisition process. 
The C-27, a small air transport of Italian design, is a good example of 
increasingly international projects in the aerospace industry and the sometimes 
complicated relationships between aerospace enterprises and their defense 
customers.  It remains a good example, even though the US version (called the C-
27J Spartan) has been cancelled. 
UAVs involve a range of designs for reconnaissance, or both reconnaissance 
and strike.  We attempted to place the rapid growth of UAVs in context – as a major 
development both in military affairs and in the defense industrial base.  UAVs are an 
important part of the two ongoing Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs).  Within that 
context, UAVs are an important continuation of the reconnaissance-strike 
embodiment of the information technology (IT)-enabled RMA first demonstrated in 
the Gulf War of 1991.  They are also useful countermeasures against the IT-enabled 
RMA practiced by terrorist and insurgent groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
The effect on the international defense marketplace has, quite possibly, been 
even more profound.  The relative simplicity and cheapness of UAVs means that 
these systems can be developed with company resources outside the “normal” 
defense acquisition system, with its highly complex and potentially burdensome 
processes.  A closely related point is that defense systems in this realm are open to 
a much wider range of suppliers.  In fact, a large number of enterprises have been 
able to finance UAV development projects with their own funds.  Countries with high 
technology and small size, such as Israel, are world leaders in unmanned systems. 
In this report, we continue our inquiry into the international defense 
marketplace and industrial base by focusing on the less-than-cordial rivalry between 
the EADS and Boeing.  The two have competed strenuously in the commercial 
transport aircraft market, with Boeing’s 737 series against the Airbus A320 family 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 4 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
However, the competition extends into military hardware.  For example, the 
EADS Eurofighter (Typhoon) and the Boeing F/A-18 (Super Hornet) both submitted 
unsuccessful proposals for India’s next tactical fighter.  Also, the EADS A400M has 
taken dead aim at the Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft (as well as the 
Lockheed C-130).   
However, the largest military aircraft contest involving Boeing and EADS was 
the prolonged source selection process for the KC-X.  In a real sense, this was a 
competition between an EADS commercial product, the A330, and Boeing’s, the 
767.  In 2011, the prolonged story of KC-X source selection apparently ended with 
the US Air Force Boeing KC-46 being chosen.  We consider the issues associated 
with this last source selection iteration in Chapter II of this report.  Among other 
things, it appears that the quarrelsome committee (especially the industrial players) 
so evident in previous iterations (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2010; Franck, Lewis, 
Matthews, & Udis, 2011) had grown weary of conflict—or perhaps the Air Force and 
Department of Defense (DoD) had become more adept at working around the 
dynamics of that committee. 
In a larger context, the Boeing-EADS rivalry has become one of the major 
features in the structure of the global aerospace industry.  But that ground may be 
shifting.  The most profitable product lines for both companies have been the 
narrow-body airliners, the Boeing 737 and the A320 (manufactured by Airbus).  
Although this part of the EADS-Boeing rivalry has been pursued as strenuously as 
the others, the international market has provided ample opportunities for both.  In 
fact, narrow-body sales have provided the profits that make possible the wide-body 
commercial developments—such as the A350 and 380 and the B-787 and 747-8. 
But that market is becoming more “contestable.” (as defined in Baumol et al., 
1982).  A number of regional jet manufacturers in Brazil, Canada, China, and Russia 
are seeking ways to enter the market niche now thoroughly occupied by Boeing and 
EADS.  If serious competition develops for the B737 and A320, then there are 
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In Chapter III, we discuss the nature of the Boeing-Airbus narrow-body 
duopoly; the plans and progress of the aspiring new competitors; and also the 
incumbents’ responses.  Finally, Chapter IV essays some concluding comments, 
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II. The KC-X Saga (Continued) 
Since power projection and long-range strike is key to US Air Force doctrine, 
aerial refueling is a key competency for that service.  Having high confidence in this 
mission capability is accordingly a matter of high priority for US military aviation. 
This is certainly not new thinking for the US air arms.  Serious 
experimentation in aerial refueling dates back to 1923.  After World War II, aerial 
refueling became an integral part of the US military’s operational repertoire.  The first 
operational US. tankers were bomber derivatives—KB-29 and KB-50.  These aircraft 
had retired from active service by the mid-1960s.2  Variations of transport aircraft 
proved a better solution (Smith, 1998, especially pp. 1, 43–47). 
The first transport-derivative aerial tanker for the US was the KC-97 (closely 
related to the Boeing Model 377 Stratocruiser), which served from 1950 to 1978, and 
then the highly successful KC-135 (first delivery in 1957) which remains in service 
today (Smith, 1998, esp., pp. 43–47).  What is firmly settled is that effective aerial 
tankers are more like transport aircraft than bombers. 
Since the last KC-135 delivery occurred in 1965, the Air Force accordingly 
has become concerned in this last decade with problems and risks associated with 
age.  This motivated the first Air Force attempt to first supplement and then replace 
KC-135s with a newer design, the Boeing 767.3   
The ideal tanker aircraft to replace the KC-135 is likely a brand-new version of 
the KC-135.  But that could be very expensive.  Accordingly, the Air Force sensibly 
stuck to off-the-shelf commercial transport designs in later attempts at source 
selection —the Boeing KC-767 (KC-46) and the EADS A320 (KC-45). 
                                            
2 Tankers as bomber variants continued for a period thereafter in other air forces—such as Victor 
(Royal Air Force) and Badger and Bison (Soviet Air Force). 
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A. The Prolonged KC-X Competition: Version 34 
The third (and final) KC-X competition began officially on 24 September 2009, 
with the release of the draft RFP for the KC-X (Defense Industry Daily [DID], 7 
March 2011).  Despite the negative comment from the Northrop Grumman-EADS 
team, the final RFP was released on 24 February 2010 with only minor changes.  
(This part of the KC-X saga is discussed in more detail in one of our previous 
reports, Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2010, especially pp. 6–8.) 
The announced schedule was 90 days for the competitors to respond 
(subsequently extended), followed by 120 days for the DoD to evaluate those 
proposals.  Not surprisingly, both Boeing (767) and EADS (A330, without Northrop 
Grumman) responded in early July 2010.  A source selection was therefore to be 
expected in November. 
The Air Force adopted a deliberately measured approach to evaluating the 
proposals, stating the need to get source selection done right rather than quickly.  
The Air Force Chief of Staff endorsed this approach and repeatedly declined to 
commit to a source selection date (Tiron, 2010, 12 October).  And November indeed 
came and went without a source selection announcement or an estimated selection 
date (Scully, 2010, November 22).  
About the same time, the process was further delayed by an administrative 
error.  In November, the Air Force sent the results of the operational effectiveness 
assessment to Boeing and EADS.  However, the mailings were mixed up and each 
party received the assessment applying to the other’s aircraft (Drew, 2010, 
1December).   
The predictable result was another delay in the competition.  Given the 
political dimensions of this competition, Congress demanded hearings about the 
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incident. (Bennett, 2011, 23 January)  The DoD Inspector General also investigated 
the incident, determining that no actionable misconduct had occurred—with an 
announcement on 18 February. (Shalal-Esa, 2011, 18 February). 
The misrouted operational assessments also complicated the competition.  
The Air Force chose to level the playing field by giving both sides both operational 
assessments. (Drew, 2010, 1 December)  Since a major selection criterion was 
operational effectiveness, both parties had significantly more information than was 
intended from which to base their revised offers (an issue we discuss in Section 
II.D.). 
B. EADS’ KC-45 as the Clear Favorite 
Even without a U.S. partner, EADS was rated a solid favorite to win the much-
delayed source selection announcement.  The A330 tanker had won international 
competitions against Boeing 767 for service with the air forces of the UK, Saudi 
Arabia, Australia, and the UAE (28 total aircraft; Rothman 2010, 17 December; 
Airbus Military, n.d.).5  By comparison, the Boeing 767 was chosen by Italy and 
Japan (8 total aircraft).  However, Israel Aircraft Industries has started a program to 
convert 767 airframes to “multi-mission tanker transports”; one such aircraft recently 
entered service with the Colombian Air Force (Trimble, 2010; Eshel, 2010). 
In addition, the previous NG-EADS entry (KC-45) was chosen in the 2008 
competition—with some commentators6 noting a 6% price advantage.  The 
increased rate of A330 production since then (from 76 per year in 2007 to 87 in 
                                            
5 However, this comparison can be overdone.  The countries mentioned intend to have one model of 
aerial tanker in service.  The US intends to have three.  So, while an A330 tanker may be a better 
general-purpose aerial tanker (plus transport, etc.), a B767 tanker may well be a better choice for 
what is regarded generally as a KC-135 replacement—as part of a tanker force structure with multiple 
aircraft types.  In addition, the US has a large and varied airlift fleet, making multi-role transport 
aircraft a less appealing choice. 
6 Much of the details in these competitions in not yet available—for good reasons.  Accordingly, we 
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2010) might well lower the EADS tanker costs (and bid price; Smith, 2011).  By 
comparison, the Boeing 767 was apparently nearing the end of its production in 
2010, with production rates 7 per year in 2007 and 20 in 20117 (Boeing B767, 2012, 
which contains links to underlying data).  In addition, the A330 had 349 orders 
outstanding at the end of 2011, while the 767 had 72 (Airbus A330, 2012, with 
links).8 
The A330 can carry (and offload) more fuel (Fulghum, 2010), giving it an 
advantage in the form of reduced adjusted cost according to the revised source 
selection criteria (Lynn, Carter, & Donley, 2009).  The operational assessment model 
(Integrated Fleet Air Refueling Assessment, or IFARA) imputed greater effectiveness 
to the A330 tanker—with the unit bid price adjusted downward accordingly.9   
The A330’s greater operational capacity as a tanker was viewed by all 
concerned as a major, perhaps decisive, factor.  As a result of the Air Force 
mistakenly sending the A330 IFARA model’s assessment to Boeing, the B767 
assessment to EADS, both parties ended up receiving both assessments—as 
discussed previously.  With this information available, Boeing leadership was 
reported to be “downright alarmed.”  The operational effectiveness appeared to give 
the EADS tanker a decisive edge. (Gates, 2010, 7 December) 
Boeing complained publicly about the Air Force use of the IFARA model, 
citing assumptions that were said to minimize the basing advantage of the 767 
tanker (due primarily to less weight and ramp space needed).  In addition, Boeing 
charged serious underestimates of fuel-savings differences between the two aircraft 
                                            
7 Moreover, at least some of the increased 767 deliveries after 2008 reflected delays in the Boeing 
787 program. 
8 We’re not so sure.  While the A330 production rate increased by 14% from 2007 to 2011, B767 
production doubled.  In addition, while Airbus had 837 airframes on its learning curve at the end of 
2011, Boeing had 1014. 
9 Using the widely publicized refueling effectiveness ratio of 1.2:1 for the A330 versus the B767 (e.g., 
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(over a 40-year operational life) and choice of notional home bases, which were 
used to estimate support infrastructure costs  (Gates, 2010, 7 December; Boeing. 
n.d.d.) 
Even if the Boeing charges had merit, few observers, if any, expected they 
would prevent the inevitable EADS victory.  Perhaps most telling to outside 
observers was the general opinion expressed in the press.  Even the Seattle 
Times—Boeing’s hometown newspaper and a reliable supporter— echoed the 
consensus.  The Times reported that the EADS entry was likely to win the KC-X 
competition.  The Times also reported that Boeing itself expected to lose the KC-X 
competition. (Gates, 2010, 7 December) 
C. The Final Offers   
Because of those inadvertent operational assessment data disclosures 
discussed previously, both Boeing and EADS were unusually well-informed 
regarding the situation (Muradian, 2010, 19 November).  Judging from press reports, 
both parties had reasonably complete knowledge of how the Air Force would 
proceed from the bid price to the Total Evaluated Price for its KC-X proposal (Lynn 
et al., 2009).  And Boeing was especially well-informed because part of the 
debriefing following the 2008 KC-45 award to the NG-EADS team included the 
pricing strategy associated with the winning bid. (Reed, 2009)  It is very likely that 
Boeing had calculated that their bid would not win the competition without a 
significant revision. 
EADS appeared highly confident of the strength of its proposal.  This 
confidence was reflected in both public statements and press reports.  In early 
February 2011, EADS stated that it did not intend to adjust its bid. (Siebold, 2011,5 
February)  In mid-February, that position was changed slightly with a somewhat 
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Boeing, on the other hand, had a serious problem in preparation of its BAFO 
(Agence France Presse [AFP], 2011, 1 February)  Their choices were among evils: 
losing the competition, or committing to an uncomfortably low bid.  Boeing chose the 
latter.  It revised its bid price to a level that was undoubtedly close to the bare 
minimum for the firm.  The bid was publicly described as being “aggressive,” while 
sufficiently prudent to safeguard shareholders’ interests. (Hepher & Shalal-Esa, 
2011, 25 February)  As Boeing’s CEO put it, “I think the (shareholders) would be 
glad if we won at the bid level we put in and would be happy if we lost at a lower 
level” (Drew, 2011, 24 February)  
For the end game of the competition, EADS acted as if it had a very good 
hand.  Boeing did considerable soul-searching over what it would take to win the 
source selection.  The result turned out to be a winning bid, but with definite risks to 
Boeing’s bottom line. 
D. Boeing’s BAFO Business Case Analysis: A Plausible 
Reconstruction 
While there’s unlikely ever to be complete disclosure as to how Boeing 
reached its final offer, it’s possible to construct a plausible rationale for that decision, 
using business case analysis (BCA) methodology.  Boeing’s BCA undoubtedly 
addressed three basic questions (Franck, 2012): 
1) Is the proposed course of action consistent with the Boeing’s corporate 
mission, vision, and strategy? 
2) Is Boeing capable of executing the contract? 
3) Will Boeing make money (and serve its shareholders) by making an 
aggressive bid? 
In reverse order, the answers to those questions are roughly as follows.  The 
company’s decision makers must have known the answer to Question 3 was not a 
lot.  In fact, Boeing had serious concerns about the profitability of the KC-X program 
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Boeing clearly had the capability to execute the contract (Question 2).  The 
technical pieces were pretty much assembled—based on the KC-767 program 
experience, and the cockpit displays developed for the B787 program.   
As an issue of vision (Question 1), winning the KC-X competition was central 
to Boeing’s view of itself as an aircraft manufacturer.  Boeing had been the main 
tanker supplier to the U.S. Air Force for many decades.10  While perhaps debatable 
as a strategic move, it was clearly part of Boeing’s image of itself, and integral to the 
corporate vision.  As one well-informed and highly placed DoD official put it, 
“Boeing’s final offer was an existential moment” for the company.11 
Other strategic issues were involved.  Given the size and winner-take-all 
nature of the competition, an unsuccessful bid meant decades outside the aerial 
tanker market.  Being forced out was especially a worry for Boeing; EADS, by 
comparison, had been more successful in selling tanker variants of the A330 to other 
nations.12   
Since EADS had tied its proposed US production facility to success in the KC-
X competition, winning the contract would likely keep Airbus production facilities 
outside the United States for a considerable time.  Also, a KC-X win would keep 
Boeing’s 767 production line open for more than a decade.  Boeing would then have 
the opportunity to make other 767 sales—with aircraft benefitting from the cockpit 
improvements developed for the KC-46.  These aircraft were generally called the 
Boeing 767-2C (Sirak, 2011 17 October; Butler,  2011, 22 September)  Also, 
keeping the 767 production line open longer would provide an alternative to the 
Boeing 787 and help contain damage from that program’s delays. 
                                            
10 The Boeing aerial tanker lineage included the KB-29 first operational in the late 1940s, through the 
KB-50, KC-97, KC-135, and KC-10.  The last was a McDonnell-Douglas product, but Boeing merged 
with the latter firm in 1997. 
11 This discussion took place a few months after the Boeing KC-46 selection and was understood as 
being not for attribution. 
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E. Explaining the KC-46 Selection 
However, the expert consensus was dead wrong.  How did Boeing’s KC-46 
become the Air Force’s choice?  The remainder of this section offers multiple 
explanations. 
1. Why the KC-46?  The Story Viewed from the Request for Proposal 
(RFP) 
The KC-46 is a tanker variant of the Boeing 767-200ER, whose 2012 
“average list price” is $150million. (Boeing, 2012)  The Boeing proposal was priced 
out at $21.4 billion (Butler, 2011, 7 March); this was a present value (PV) calculation 
of the stream of procurement costs associated with the program.  This works out to 
an Average Unit Price (AUP) of about $145 million (in real terms).  While list prices 
are typically starting points for negotiating downward, this nonetheless seems a very 
low price per aircraft.  When one considers the development costs attached to the 
KC-46 and included in the TPP, Boeing’s offer was indeed aggressive, if not 
downright low-ball.    
Similarly, EADS’ BAFO was calculated at $23.4 billion. (Butler, 2011, 7 
March); AUP was about $160 million (plus adjustments for inflation).  The EADS KC-
45 proposal involved an airframe based on the A330 MRTT (Multi-Role Tanker 
Transport).  The January 2012 list price for the A330-200 is about $200 million 
(Airbus, 2012, January).  Thus, if Boeing’s BAFO was aggressively priced, then so 
was EADS’.  
According to the rules in the proposals were evaluated in three consecutive 
phases (ASC, 2010, February 24, esp. pp. 1-11).13  These phases are summarized 
in the following text.  In addition, the evaluation process is depicted in Table 1. 
                                            
13 The phases were “consecutive” in the sense that proceeding to the next (N+1) phase could occur 
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First, proposals were screened for acceptability against 372 requirements, 
with an assessment of “acceptable” needed for all of them.  (That is, any proposal 
with an assessment of “unacceptable” for any of those 372 requirements was 
eliminated from further consideration.)   
Second, the Total Proposed Prices were adjusted for (a) operational 
effectiveness, (b) fuel costs, and (c) basing infrastructure costs.  The superior 
proposal in each category received a downward adjustment to reach a Total 
Evaluated Price (TEP).  This second phase of the evaluation is depicted in the table 
below.  If the lowest TEP differed by more than 1% from the other, then the award 
would go to the proposal with the lowest TEP.  (This is what happened—with 
Boeing’s TEP being about 9% lower than EADS’.)  The adjustments were 
determined as follows. 
 Both aircraft were assessed for operational effectiveness with respect 
to an operational scenario (taken from the 2005 Mobility Requirements 
Study).  The comparison was based on the number of aircraft needed 
to meet peak requirements in the scenario.14  The AUP adjustment 
was calculated with the following formula for the more effective entry 
(KC-45):   
AUP % adjustment = 1 – [(least effective candidate rating) / (evaluated 
candidate rating)].  For example, if the KC-45 received a 1.62 rating and the KC-46 a 
1.35 rating, then the KC-45 would receive a 17% price adjustment [1-(1.35/1.62) = 
17%]. 
 Fuel adjustment was based on expected annual flying hours per 
aircraft over a 40-year operational life.  The candidate with lower 
estimated fuel costs (KC-46) received an adjustment to reflect the 
discounted fuel savings. 
                                            
14 This approach was at least somewhat problematic.  One methodological shortcoming was the 
apparently fictional operational context.  The winning aircraft would be in a mixed aerial tanker fleet 
which included some KC-135Rs, and the KC-10s (near term), also with notional KC-Ys and KC-Zs 
(long term).  Having KC-135s in the scenario would probably have favored the KC-45.  Having KC-
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 Base infrastructure cost comparisons were based on a notional set of 
10 bases with a notional deployment schedule.  The candidate with 
lower infrastructure costs (KC-46) received a credit based on the 
discounted savings in military construction costs. 
Third, if the TPPs were within 1%, then the evaluation would proceed to the 
last phase—something of a tie breaker.  Both candidates would then be assessed 
with respect to 93 “non-mandatory” requirements (an apparent oxymoron).   
As the evaluation played out, the adjustments to the TPPs were reported as 
stated in Table 1. 
Table 1. Getting to Total Evaluated Prices (TEPs) for the KC-45 and -46 
Butler (2011, 7 March and 11 April) 
CATEGORY BOEING (KC-46) EADS (KC-45) 
TOTAL PROPOSED PRICE (TPP) 21.4 23.4 
FUEL SAVINGS (0.5) 0 
BASING INFRASTRUCTURE (0.3) 0 
WARFIGHTING EFFECTIVENESS 0 (0.8) 
TOTAL EVALUATED PRICE (TEP) 20.6 22.6 
 
However, suppose the estimated operational effectiveness of the KC-45 were 
indeed 20% more than the KC-46 (as was widely reported). The KC-45 should have 
then received a 17% [1-(1/1.2)] reduction due to greater operational effectiveness.  
That would have been an adjustment of $3.9 billion—leading to a TEP of $19.5 
billion or a clear win for the EADS KC-45.  The $800 million actually attributed to the 
KC-45 implies operational effectiveness of only about 4% more than the KC-46. 
The point of this discussion is not to critique the Air Force selection process.  
For a number of good reasons (to include protection of proprietary information), 
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However, it’s worth noting that the public record so far leads to a number of 
questions but provides fewer answers.   
Moreover, it seems to us that if the EADS KC-45 had won, and the rationale 
for the source selection had been similarly opaque, that program would face 
considerable difficulties—especially in Congress. 
2. Why the KC-46?  Changing Rules 
Some commentators (e.g., Drew, 2011, 25 February) attributed changes in 
the selection criteria (2010 versus 2007) for Boeing’s selection.  There’s something 
to be said for this perspective.  Some examples of how the revised selection criteria 
could have improved the KC-46’s chances in 2011 follow. 
The 2010 selection criteria reportedly included a harder look at basing 
(primarily ramp space) limitations for the KC-45 and KC-46.  If so, this undoubtedly 
favored the smaller KC-46 and would have reduced the KC-45 operational 
effectiveness rating due to longer transit distances to accomplish the aerial refueling 
mission.  As one informed observer put it, the Air Force realized back in 2008 that 
the A330 could not perform some wartime refueling missions in a scenario-based 
analytic model due to lack of adequate space at forward bases.  “The Air Force 
should have recognized the drawbacks of using such a big plane at that point, but 
under pressure from politicians to keep Airbus in the race, it chose to modify the 
model so the Airbus tanker could use bases off limits to the Boeing plane” 15  
(Thompson, 2011, February 25)  
The (relatively) short list of “mandatory requirements” included satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory assessments for each of 372 items.  One item in that list was 
technical risk.  Less technical risk was stated to be a major sorting factor for the Air 
                                            
15 This is a striking indictment of the 2008 source selection process and should not necessarily be 
taken at face value.  Corroborations of Thompson’s hypothesis by disinterested observers in the open 
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Force in its KC-45 source selection of 2008.  In the revised rules, both proposals 
were assessed as having acceptable risk—with no sorting beyond that (ASC, 
Section M).  Moreover, given the fixed-price nature of the contract this time, the 
contractor would bear more of that risk, making program risk a matter of less import 
to the Air Force. (Butler, 2011, 11April) 
Extending the evaluated operational life from 25 to 40 years was an 
advantage to the smaller KC-46 (Drew, 2011, 25 February).  The fuel expense 
difference was considered over a longer period.  However, this stream of cost 
differences was discounted (to a present value) in calculating the total evaluated 
price (ASC, Section M, 2010, 24 February). 
Also favoring the KC-46 was the changing airlift picture.  With continued 
procurement of C-17s, the Air Force turned out to have more-than-adequate airlift 
capability.  The most significant capability gap revealed in the Mobility Capability 
Requirements Study (MCRS-16) was relatively minor refueling shortfalls in two of 
three evaluation scenarios (Department of Defense, MCRS-16, esp.Figure 1).   
The existence of the minor refueling shortfall indicated was undoubtedly a 
matter of less concern than most aerial refueling capability currently residing in aging 
KC-135s.  This could well have been sufficient to shift attention toward the need to 
simply recapitalize the aerial tanker fleet (e.g., replace the KC-135s) and away from 
the KC-45’s greater airlift capabilities (part of the rationale offered for the KC-45 
selection in 2008). 
More generally, some commentators have noted that the Air Force shifted 
from “best” to “good enough”—or from modernization to recapitalization of its aerial 
tanker fleet.  The fixed-price contracting approach was certainly consistent with this 
sort of change in acquisition strategy.  As one observer put it, "[DoD is] not going to 
pay for bells and whistles.  That's the clear message here, and everyone should be 
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We have reservations about this last hypothesis.  If the Air Force were simply 
looking to buy replacements for KC-135s, it seems unlikely that the operational 
effectiveness adjustment to Total Proposed Price would have been an adjustment in 
reaching the Total Evaluated Price.  If, however, this means a shift toward 
recapitalization (versus modernization), we consider it a change for the better—a 
discussion for a future report. 
3. Why the KC-46?  Politics 
A separate, and not inconsistent, view is that the competition was really 
predetermined by political considerations. 
Thus, for example, a blogger with The Economist (a respected British news 
magazine) took a full-fledged Euro-chauvinist view (M.J.S., 2011, February 25).  The 
basic argument was that the only way the obviously superior KC-45 could be turned 
down in favor of the KC-46 was that EADS was hometowned in the source selection 
process—to include the rules of the game.  EADS, of course, got kudos for a gallant 
performance in a rigged contest. 
On this side of the pond, political figures stepped up to claim full credit for 
steering the KC-X contract to Boeing.  Particularly noteworthy was Representative 
Norm Dicks (D, WA), who insisted that fuel savings should be assessed over a 40-
year operational life, versus 25 years (Drew, 2011, February 25).  As Representative 
Dicks put it, "I got them to change the lifecycle costs from 25 years to 40 years.  
When you take 179 planes, and with the Airbus burning 24% more fuel than the 
Boeing plane, that's a big number. It could range from a $4 billion to $10 billion 
difference. That had to help them in a big way" (Hotakainen, 2011, February 25). 
While Dicks’ taking a lead in the 25-to-40 change is certainly credible, it’s not 
clear that his efforts “steered the contract to Boeing,” as some reports have 
stated.(Hotakainen, 2011, 25 February)  Boeing’s TEP included $500 million credit 
for lower fuel costs.  But even without this fuel credit (or that credit going to the KC-
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The most persuasive point in the politics hypothesis is that choosing the KC-
46 was likely the path of least political resistance.  Most observers assessed the 
Boeing delegation in Congress to be larger and more powerful than EADS’  (e.g., 
Butler 2011, 1 March). 
4. Why the KC-46?  A Note from Allison’s Three Models 
The previous discussion provided four separate (but not necessarily 
conflicting) explanations for the rather surprising selection of the Boeing KC-46.  
These explanations map rather nicely to some standard models of organizational 
behavior, including those found in Allison and Zelikow (1999).  Model I (Chapter 1) 
posits decisions by a Unitary Rational Actor; Model II (Chapter 3, Organizational 
Behavior) is about action taken within a bureaucracy, following established rules and 
processes.  Model III (Chapter 5) concerns governmental politics with outcomes 
determined by the interaction and bargaining among various governmental agencies 
and personalities. 
In the previous example, the first explanation offered was that the Air Force 
simply followed the rules laid out in the Request for Proposal (RFP).  This is a Model 
II explanation: a bureaucracy proceeded according to a set of agreed rules and 
processes.  It is also the official explanation from the Air Force and DoD. 
The third explanation involved governmental politics.  That is, the KC-46 
selection was really the result of contending factions within the US. Government—
some favoring the EADS KC-45, and others favoring the KC-46.  Viewed from this 
perspective, the main cause for the KC-46 selection is that the Boeing faction had 
more power than the EADS supporters. 
Yet another explanation in this section is simply that Boeing decided to do 
whatever it took to win the competition, as a matter of long-term corporate strategy.  
The business case analysis discussion mentioned previously indicates that Boeing’s 
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Finally, the changing rules explanation can’t be categorized as cleanly.  To 
the extent that the changing rules reflected changing circumstances (like more C-
17s), we have a Model I explanation.  To the extent that the rule changes were the 
results of political maneuvering, this is a Model III explanation.  To the extent that the 
new selection criteria reflected a bureaucratic search for an executable (and protest-
resistant) set of rules and processes, we have some variation of a Model II 
explanation. 
F. Post-Selection KC-46 Issues 
As noted in Section II.C, Boeing’s bid was quite low—to the point that winning 
the competition was apparently viewed as more important than making profits (at 
least in the near term).  The issues that have arisen after source selection indicate 
thin margins for error in the KC-46.  We’ll summarize these risks in this section 
through discussion of the related issues of cost, profit, and schedule. 
Since the basic KC-46 contract structure is fixed-price, the cost of the 
program directly affects Boeing’s profits.  The target price for the development 
program is $4.4 billion, with Boeing solely responsible for any costs exceeding $4.9 
billion (Butler, 2011d; Capaccio, 2011).  At present, Boeing estimates program costs 
at $5.1 billion, with the KC-46 Program Office estimate at $5.3 billion (Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval [DAMIR], 2011, 30 September, p. 
34).  Given this data, it’s difficult to see Boeing making any profit in the development 
phase, although these losses would likely be recouped over the life cycle of the KC-
46.  And Boeing’s corporate position is that it will indeed make money on the KC-46 
program but is unclear about when those profits will be realized (Wilhelm, 2011, 28 
November). 
Adding to the complication is what appears to be a highly concurrent 
schedule.  The DoD’s Director of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has assessed the 
Boeing test schedule as “unexecutable.”  Among other things, the 2011 report cited 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 22 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
tests (versus historical experience), and (c) very optimistic plan for reflights (DOT&E, 
2011, December).  The Air Force disagrees.  However, the KC-46 program manager 
nonetheless is concerned with the success-oriented nature of the current program.  
In an e-mail reply to press inquiries: “The Air Force does acknowledge that Boeing’s 
overall KC-46 program schedule is considered medium risk, in part due to its 
aggressive flight-test schedule” (Majumdar & Weisgerber, 2012, 19 January). 
In addition, Boeing has a lot of engineering tasks on its plate right now 
besides the KC-46.  These include Model 787 development, the 747-8, and the 
future of the single-aisle air transport (737) product line.  If the 787 and 747 
engineering problems are well on the way to solution, and if the 737 MAX design 
problem is manageable, then Boeing likely has the technical resources to solve any 
KC-46 problems that arise (albeit with schedule slippages and cost overruns).  But if 
there are engineering setbacks in other Boeing commercial aircraft product lines, 
then the KC-46 could also be affected.  (Mecham and Norris, for example, have an 
update on major design challenges Boeing currently faces [2012, 12 February].) 
Investment advisors have accordingly taken notice.  A Standard & Poor’s 
assessment states, "Since the KC-46A is a very competitively bid fixed-price 
contract for both development and production phases, it carries some execution 
risks for Boeing – particularly given the company's substantial cost overruns on 
some of its commercial and military programs in recent years" (quoted in AFP, 2011, 
26 February).  According to 24/7 WallSt.com, "Given Boeing's headaches getting its 
new passenger planes out the door, there should be concern about the company's 
ability to deliver the new tanker on time and on budget" (quoted in AFP, 2011, 26 
February). 
Perhaps in response, the Air Force has committed to having few, if any, 
design changes in the KC-46 program (Majumdar, 2011, March 17).  From the 
Boeing perspective, this helps protect the schedule but not profits.  (According to an 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 23 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
G. Strengthened Acquisition Practices from the KC-X 
Experiences 
The Air Force and DoD claim a number of lessons learned from the KC-X 
competitions that are now recognized as good practice—based in considerable 
measure from those lessons being disseminated throughout the DoD acquisition 
work force (Butler, 2011, September 19)  General Norton Schwartz, Air Force Chief 
of Staff, stated, “We learned tough lessons in the recent KC-X air refueling tanker 
procurement competition, so you can expect that the recent awarding of the KC-46A 
contract will serve as the standard for open, fair, and disciplined acquisition as we 
move forward”  (Schwartz, 2011, March 2).   General Schwartz also stated, “[The 
KC-46] will be ideally the model going forward for proper requirement discipline, 
proper program execution, proper partnering and collaboration with the contractor 
…”  (Weisgerber, 2012, February 27). 
Those new, or strengthened, practices include the following. 
 Readily understandable and transparent source selection criteria: the 
selection criteria were made as simple as was reasonable, with the 
intent of making results (and selection rationale) fully transparent to the 
parties concerned (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public 
Affairs; OASD (PA)], 2011, 24 February; Schwartz, 2011, 2 March; 
Majumdar, 2011, 24 February) 
 The importance of a skilled acquisition work force.  Even though the 
KC-X source selection process of 2010–2011 was relatively simple by 
most standard criteria, the Air Force nonetheless chose something of 
an elite team to manage it.  As one commentator put it, “The Pentagon 
expended extraordinary effort on the competition: Not only did the Air 
Force’s procurement A-team oversee it for years, but the Defense 
Department also drew on expertise from the Navy and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense.”  (Butler, 2011,19 September).Moreover, the 
DoD has set out to upgrade numbers and skills of its acquisition 
corps—reversing a course set at the end of the Cold War  
 More use of fixed-price contracts when appropriate.  This practice is 
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contractor proposals.16  According to the Air Force Senior Acquisition 
Officer, David van Buren, “Capping the government’s liability through a 
number of years was a real measure of success.  The government’s 
maximum exposure is $4.9 billion” (Butler, 2011, 19 September). 
However, it seems that one overarching purpose of these initiatives is making 
source selections as protest-resistant as possible.  As Deputy Secretary of Defense 
William Lynn stated, “We think we've established a clear, a transparent and an open 
process.  We think we've executed on that, and that will not yield grounds for 
protest” (OASD[PA], 2011, 24 February). 
H. Acquisition Practices Tested: The Light Air Support 
Aircraft 
The Air Force is acquiring light air support (LAS) aircraft with the near-term 
intent of providing 20 of them to the Afghan Air Force.  The initial RFP was issued in 
October 2010, with Embraer-Sierra Nevada and Hawker Beechcraft Defense 
Company (HBDC) identified as competitors based on initial proposals.17  In October 
2011, the Air Force concluded that HBDC had not rectified deficiencies in its 
proposal and notified the company of exclusion from the competition on 1 November 
2011 – with delivery of the correspondence on 4 November.  (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2011, 22 December). 
On 15 November, Hawker Beechcraft requested a debriefing from the Air 
Force, which declined (16 November) on the grounds that the request was not 
timely.  On 21 November, HBDC filed a protest with the GAO, claiming among other 
things that the original Air Force notice was misaddressed (GAO, 2011, 22 
                                            
16 This seems related to the relative simplicity of selection criteria this time around.  As discussed 
previously, one of the Phase 1 criteria in this last KC-X competition was technical risk— “acceptable” 
or not.  As it turns out, Boeing put forth a fairly optimistic final offer, both in terms of schedule and cost 
of the development phase.  In any case, the fixed-price nature of the contract limited Air Force 
exposure to those risks. 
17 Embraer (a Brazilian corporation) teamed with Sierra Nevada Corporation (Sparks, NV) to offer the 
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December).  According to a Hawker Beechcraft press release, “HBC's exclusion 
from competing for this important contract appears at this point to have been made 
without basis in process or fact. We are very interested in learning more about the 
decision and look forward to the results of the GAO's review" (Hawker Beechcraft, 
2011, November 22).  
On 22 December, the GAO dismissed the protest as “untimely and must be 
dismissed” (GAO, 2011, 22 December).  Hawker Beechcraft still felt uninformed 
about the reasons for its disqualification and filed suit in federal court on 27 
December 2011.  According to Hawker Beechcraft CEO Bill Boisture, “We are 
disappointed in the GAO's decision as we were relying on their investigation to 
provide transparency into what has been a bidding process of inconsistent, irregular 
and constantly changing requirements.  We find ourselves still without answers, 
which is unacceptable, and continue to believe that our exclusion from this important 
contract was made without basis in process or fact" (Hawker Beechcraft, 2011, 27 
December).   
On 30 December 2011, , the DoD announced a contract award to Sierra 
Nevada and Embraer for the 20 A-29s (OASD[PA], 2011, 30 December).  But the Air 
Force subsequently issued a stop-work order to the Embraer-Sierra Nevada team on 
4 January 2012 "due to litigation currently pending before the US Court of Federal 
Claims.” (AFA, 2012, 5 January)  According to an Air Force spokesman, "The 
competition and source selection evaluation were fair, open, and transparent. The 
Air Force is confident in the merits of its contract award decision and anticipates that 
the litigation will be quickly resolved" (AFA, 2012, 5 January). 
The complications in the LAS competition seem to provide a good test of the 
Air Force’s renewed commitment to improved acquisition practices.  Taken at face 
value, the Hawker Beechcraft allegations directly rebut the Air Force claim of open, 
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Subsequent to the stop-work order, the Air Force set aside the selection 
award to the Sierra Nevada-Embraer team, effective March 2, 2012.  In addition, the 
HBDC AT-6 was reinstated to the competition (Hegeman, 2012, 28 February).  The 
reason for this action was, according to Secretary of the Air Force Donley, “the Air 
Force senior acquisition executive, David Van Buren, is not satisfied with the quality 
of the documentation supporting the award decision"  (Hodge, 2012,29 February).   
The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, called the result an 
“embarrassment” and promised to work toward a rework of the selection process 
“with all dispatch” (AFP, 2012,29 February).  An unkind, but reasonable, 
interpretation is that the Air Force discovered that the LAS source selection process 
would not stand up to the light of day; that is, the era of transparent, fair, and open 
source selections is not yet here. 
A quick and favorable resolution of the Hawker Beechcraft litigation would 
indeed have provided a useful demonstration of the Air Force’s strengthened 
commitment to fairness, openness, and transparency in its acquisition practices.  As 
it stands now, the LAS source selection shows uncomfortable similarities to the KC-
X process of 2008.  Initial award goes to international team.  Domestic competitor 
protests ensue.  Initial award is set aside, with a promise to quickly restart the 
competition.  This puts us about where we were with the KC-X in the summer of 
2008.  (Butler and Warwick [2012, 5 March] make similar observations.)  There’s 
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III. Airbus and Boeing: Beleaguered Dupolists? 
A. Introduction 
Most short-to-medium range airline trips take place using a plane from one of 
two narrow-body aircraft families: the Airbus A320 and the Boeing 737.  Over 7,000 
examples of both families are currently in service, with order backlogs at both 
manufacturers still in the thousands, although these aircraft are no longer 
representative of state-of-the-art aviation technology.  
Perhaps in response to perceived inertia on the part of the two global giants 
of aviation, a number of aircraft manufacturers that have traditionally built smaller 
aircraft are developing potential competitors to the A320 and Boeing 737.  In this 
chapter, we will discuss the origins of today’s narrow-body aircraft as well as 
describe the key features of the products offered by the new entrants. 
Our discussion begins with the first commercially-successful jet airliner, the 
Boeing 707, and the lineage that led to the Boeing 737 and the development of the 
competing Airbus A320.  We will then continue by reviewing the aircraft developed 
by the new entrants into the mainline narrow-body market: Bombardier (Canada), 
Embraer (Brazil), Comac (China), and Sukkhoi and Irkut (Russia). 
Since World War II, aircraft, both military and commercial, have always been 
at the forefront in demanding the latest in information technology, propulsion 
systems, engineering, aerodynamics, advanced materials, manufacturing 
techniques, fuel efficiency, reliability, as well as minimization of capital and operating 
costs while allowing for varying degrees of passenger comfort.  The advent of mass 
airline travel, which took place in two stages following the introduction of the Boeing 
707 in 1954 and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, has significantly increased the 
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The enormous success of the A320 and Boeing 737 (the latter being the most 
successful aircraft ever built) created a volume-oriented manufacturing culture at 
both Airbus and Boeing, which served to cross-subsidize the development and 
production of wide-body aircraft, which are produced in smaller quantities and with 
more variants.  The two global leaders may be facing a new era where this financial 
advantage is no longer as strong.  However, the enormous number of Airbus and 
Boeing airliners in service has created a global system of aircraft support that any 
new entrant would find to be a formidable capability to match.  We will explore these 
issues in this chapter. 
B. Origins of the Boeing 737 
The Boeing 707, which went into service in 1954, was the first commercially 
successful jet airliner.  The 707 was a modification of the four-engine U.S. Air Force 
KC-135 Stratotanker.  Boeing slightly widened the fuselage of the KC-135, so that 
six-across seating (two groups of three seats divided by an aisle) would be possible.  
This seating density, which introduced the “middle seat” so beloved by air travelers, 
was necessary in order to reach an economic capacity of 141 passengers (Boeing, 
2010a).   
Later in the 1950s, the Douglas DC-8 and Convair 880 entered the market as 
competitors to the Boeing 707.  The Convair 880 and its successor, the 990, were 
not commercially successful.  (Haskin, 2004)  Pratt & Whitney’s first production 
turbofan, the JT3D, powered both the 707 and DC-8.  The JT3D was a derivative of 
the TF33 used on military aircraft, and each turbofan provided 18,000 lbs. of thrust 
(Pratt & Whitney, 2010; Boeing, 2010a). 
Boeing initially designed the 707 for cross-country and intercontinental 
service.  However, the popularity of jet airliners reached the point where both Boeing 
and Douglas began to consider a jetliner with fewer than four engines that would fly 
shorter distances and replace propeller aircraft.  Propeller aircraft flew slower and 
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However, Boeing and Douglas took radically different approaches to creating 
a smaller, shorter-range version of the 707 and DC-8.  In 1963, Boeing launched the 
727, powered by three JT8D engines mounted on the sides and top of the rear 
fuselage.  Capacity was 149 (727-100) or 189 (727-200) passengers, with a range of 
1400–1800 nautical miles.  Boeing used the 707 fuselage as a basis for the 727, 
maintaining the six-across seating pattern (Jane’s, 1991–1992). With the 727, the 
first “downsized” jet airliner for short-range routes was born.18 
In contrast, Douglas decided not to use the DC-8 (six-across) fuselage on the 
DC-9, which was launched in 1965, with an initial seating capacity of 90 (DC-9-10) 
(growing to 135 on the DC-9-50 model, all featuring 3+2 seating).  Two JT8D 
engines mounted on the sides of the rear fuselage provided a maximum of 1,685 
nautical miles of range.  Douglas designed the DC-9 as a smaller, shorter-range 
aircraft than the Boeing 727, carrying fewer passengers over a significantly shorter 
distance.  A key innovation was that while the DC-9’s flight deck instrumentation was 
very similar to that of the DC-8, the DC-9 was one of the first aircraft to eliminate the 
position of flight engineer, further enhancing the economics of short-haul jet 
transportation (Boeing, 2010b). 
Following a 1967 acquisition of Douglas by McDonnell and the subsequent 
2007 purchase of McDonnell Douglas by Boeing, the DC-9 continued in production 
as the MD-80, with the last version being designated as the Boeing 717.  The 717, 
which was an updated and stretched DC-9 with the same JT8D engines, was only a 
limited success, with the last delivery in 2006 (Boeing, 2010b).  The DC-9 was 
                                            
18 Our discussion of airliners (often referred to nowadays as “mainline” airliners to provide a distinction 
from regional jets) provides some background for the emergence of the regional jet.  Accordingly, for 
purposes of brevity, we have excluded the large number of jet airliners produced in Europe during the 
1960s and early 1970s.  These airliners included the Sud-Aviation Caravelle (similar to the DC-9 and 
notably purchased by United), the BAC 1-11 and Trident (similar to the DC-9 and B727), and the 
Dassault Mercure (much like the B737).  While Europe enjoyed an undisputed advantage in 
turboprop technology in the postwar period, it was late to effectively compete with U.S. manufacturers 
on single-aisle jet aircraft, prior to the creation of Airbus and the first flight of the A320 on March 28, 
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perhaps the precursor of today’s regional jets, demonstrating that downsizing a four-
engine intercontinental jetliner into a short-range, two-engine aircraft was possible.   
Before turning to the rise of true regional jets, we will first discuss the Boeing 
737 and the competing A320 family.19 These two aircraft represent today the state of 
the art in short-range jetliner design based on traditional “mainline” aircraft. 
C. Boeing 737: The Most Popular Jetliner in History 
The Boeing 737 entered service in 1968 with Lufthansa.  Nicknamed “Fat 
Albert,” the aircraft used a shortened B707 fuselage combined with two JT8D 
engines.  Typical seating capacity in two-class configuration was 110.  Boeing 
delivered the first 737-300 to Southwest Airlines in 1984. The updated aircraft 
replaced the JT8D engines with the GE/Snecma (CFM International) CFM56 and a 
high-bypass turbofan and reduced the flight deck crew to two. 
The 737 is the most successful airliner ever built.  Since 1968, Boeing has 
delivered over 6,000 units and has an order backlog exceeding 3,000 as of October 
2010.  Since the beginning of 2010, Boeing more than tripled its 737 sales (to 472), 
compared with all of 2009 (Ray, 2010).     
The six-across 1950s seating with 17-inch-wide coach seats is a bane of 
travelers (a result of sticking with the B707 fuselage after more than 50 years).  
However, the plane’s relatively low capital and operating costs and wide availability 
of parts make it popular with both full-service and discount carriers.  There are also a 
number of military variants throughout the world, most recently the U.S. Navy’s P-8A 
Poseidon and the Royal Australian Air Force’s Wedgetail. 
                                            
19 The A320 family includes aircraft in the A318–A321 series.  The principal difference is in fuselage 
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The most recent commercial model in service is the 737-900ER, which 
entered service in 2007.  The 737-900ERl can carry 215 passengers in a single-
class configuration with a range of 3,200 nautical miles. 
All B737s beginning with the -300 variant have used the CFM56 engine.  The 
bottom of the CFM56’s engine nacelle is slightly flattened on the B737.  This results 
from the need to fit a modern high-bypass turbofan engine under a wing that extends 
from the fuselage at an approximately 90° angle.  The flat bottom ensures adequate 
ground clearance, particularly on takeoff and landing.  The CFM56 variant used on 
the A320, a more modern aircraft, has a larger and entirely circular cowling.  High-
bypass turbofans have been standard on new aircraft from over 25 years, but the 
even B737-900ER remains at its heart a small straight wing Boeing 707.  This 
design limitation restricts the power and fuel efficiency of the 737.  We will return to 
this issue following a discussion of the Airbus A320 family and the emergence of 
regional jets (Boeing, 2010c; Jane’s, 2010e; Norris, Wall, & Anselmo, 2010). 
D. The A320 Family: Unprecedented Competition 
Airbus’ first commercial airline products were the A300/A310 wide-bodies 
launched during the 1970s.  At this point, Boeing’s U.S. competitors were 
diminishing.  Lockheed (now Lockheed Martin) had discontinued the wide-body 
L1011 Tristar, and McDonnell Douglas was producing only the DC-10 and MD-80, 
whose ultimate versions were the MD-11 and MD-80 (formerly the DC-9 Super 80).  
The only narrow-body competition for the B737 was the stalwart DC-9. 
There was no competition in the short-to-medium-range jet market in the 100-
to-150-passenger range.  Airbus launched the A320 family in response.  The first 
delivery of the A320-100 (to Air France) took place in 1988.  Since then, Airbus has 
delivered 4,425 units of this narrow-body transport, with over 2,000 more on order.  
Seating is six-across but with seats 1.5 inches wider than on the Boeing 707 
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Notably, the A320 is the first subsonic commercial aircraft equipped for fly-by-
wire (FBW) throughout the entire normal flight regime.  This feature, which saves a 
great deal of weight, also permits joystick (rather than yoke) control of the primary 
functions of the aircraft.  The FBW and joystick were controversial but have since 
become standard on commercial airliners.  The two engines are a more fuel-
efficient, high-bypass version of the CFM56 due to the higher wing compared to the 
B737.   
International Aero Engines (IAE)20 also offers its V2500 engine; all power 
plants on the A320 have 22,000–25,000 pounds of thrust, but the higher bypass 
ratio and FBW make it a more fuel-efficient aircraft than the B737.  The A320 and 
B737 continue to compete vigorously in the commercial market for narrow-body 
aircraft, despite the fact that the original designs are aging.   
Both Airbus and Boeing have recognized that re-engining and other possible 
changes are prerequisites to continued sales, but the high order backlogs on both 
models and heavy investments and development problems on larger aircraft such as 
the B747-8, B787, A350, and A400M have made decisions about the future of these 
two popular transports particularly difficult for both firms (Airbus, 2012a; Jane’s, 
2010c; Airbus v Boeing, 2010; Wall, Norris, & Flottau, 2010). 
While Airbus states that airlines are clamoring for a re-engined A320, Steven 
Udvar-Hazy, chairman of International Lease Finance Corporation, the world’s 
largest aircraft leasing firm, does not share that view.  An influential figure in the 
aviation industry, Udvar-Hazy expressed the opinion that re-engining the A320 (and, 
by analogy, the 737) would offer only “a very slim margin” of benefits to aircraft 
operators.  Airbus Sales Chief John Leahy responded: “Almost all airlines are 
requesting” the new engine option.  If we followed the advice of some leasing 
companies, i.e., ‘No Change,’ we would still be flying 727s and consuming twice as 
                                            
20 IAE is a partnership of Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce, Japanese Aero Engine Corporation, and 
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much fuel.  We, as an industry, have an obligation to be as fuel efficient and 
environmentally friendly as possible.”  Airbus, based in Toulouse in southern France, 
says the new engines offer 15% in fuel efficiency, translating into added value per 
plane of $7 million to $9 million. Udvar-Hazy said the actual benefit to carriers is 
much lower, partly because Airbus and engine-makers will seek to recoup some of 
their investments (Rothman, 2010, 21 October). 
Airbus mentioned that an announcement would be forthcoming on an A320 
New Engine Option (NEO) before the end of 2010 but had not done so at the time of 
writing (Sanders, 2010b).  The NEO features the Pratt & Whitney PW1000G Geared 
Turbofan (GTF), which is expected to bring a double-digit reduction in fuel burn.  The 
GTF has yet to be proven and certificated. In 2010, the redesigned A320 also 
included “sharklet” wingtip devices on the A320 for a further 3.5% efficiency gain.   
Potential NEO launch customer Qatar Airways is in talks with Pratt & Whitney 
with respect to the NEO.  However, Qatar is also holding discussions with 
Bombardier for its upcoming CSeries regional jet (Kinglsey-Jones, Compart, & 
Flottau, 2010).  As discussed in the next section, Boeing did not have a realistic 
option of re-engining without a redesigned (or entirely new) aircraft to compete with 
the A320neo and regional jet competition. 
E. Design Limits of the 737 vs. Impetus for Change 
We mentioned previously that the 707’s fuselage served as a basis for the 
737.  In addition, the wings extend from the fuselage in an essentially straight 
manner.  We also mentioned that the CFM56 engine must fit into a flattened nacelle 
in order to maintain adequate ground clearance.  Newer aircraft such as the A320 
have their wings tilted up, both to accommodate the newer, more powerful, and fuel-
efficient high-bypass engines and to improve aerodynamics. 
Boeing’s 737-800 (seating 162) delivered to Continental Airlines in October 
2010 included a slightly more efficient CFM56 engine variant that represented the 
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also redesigned wheel fairings, exhaust duct doors, wing surfaces, and anti-collision 
lights in order to reduce drag.  The total impact of these engine and structural 
changes improve fuel efficiency by about 2%.  However, customers do just not want 
minor improvement increases in fuel in fuel consumption but also the reliability that 
comes with a proven engine (in the case of the CFM56, 99.98%) as well as 
“quantum leaps in efficiency” (Sanders, 2010b). 
During September 2010, Boeing was clear that the 737 was an obsolete 
design.  The plane could not be further tweaked to improve fuel efficiency or 
operating cost: 
Boeing provided its strongest indication yet that it will not re-engine the 737. 
CFO James Bell says a new engine would provide only a single-digit 
improvement in efficiency once the cost and weight gain from a new design 
are factored in, far below the 15-20% that airlines are likely to be seeking. 
“Our customers have not shown a real interest in a re-engined airplane,” Bell 
said. Meanwhile, Louis Chenevert, CEO of Pratt & Whitney parent United 
Technologies, predicted that Airbus will announce a re-engining of the A320 
by year-end. (“Re-Engine No-Go?,” 2010) 
During October 2010, Boeing management decided that Airbus’ expected 
announcement of a re-engined A320 needed to be taken seriously.  Boeing could 
simply not continue to turn away customers searching for an efficient new narrow-
body aircraft without offering something in return.  At that time, the firm  committed to 
a completely new 737 rather than solely to engine replacement: 
Boeing Co. said it favors an all-new 737 single-aisle jet over an upgrade of 
the existing version and is studying whether to add more seats to help reduce 
carbon emissions per passenger.  “Our job is to improve the operating 
efficiency,” Jim Albaugh, chief executive officer of Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes, said yesterday after the company reported earnings.  “Re- engining 
is one way to do it, but quite frankly the business case for re-engining is not 
as compelling as we’d like to see.” (Kingsley-Jones, Compart, & Flottau, 
2010) 
The difference in corporate strategy between the two manufacturers has been 
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Although Airbus and Boeing have since been evaluating re-engined 
widebodies, Airbus has always appeared the more likely manufacturer to go 
ahead.  This is partly due to the fact that it does not see a clean-sheet 
narrowbody replacement offering the required step-up in technology and 
operating cost savings until the middle of the 2020s, whereas Boeing is more 
bullish that such an aircraft could be developed for service entry before the 
end of the current decade. (Kingsley-Jones, Compart, & Flottau, 2010) 
Boeing has also commented directly on its strategy related to the 737: 
Airlines don’t seem to be interested in a 737 with new engines because it 
would add complexity to their fleets, Nicole Piasecki, Boeing’s vice president 
of business development, said on Nov. 3. Different engines on the same 
model make maintenance more complicated.  
There are virtually no customers I can name off the top of my head, 
throughout their executive suites, that are pushing us to re-engine,” Piasecki 
said. “Right now, there is so much demand for the 737 and 777 that our 
primary focus, after delivering the 787 and 747-8, is getting production up.”  
Nonetheless, Boeing eventually changed its mind (or found new ideas).  The 
redesign is called the Boeing 737MAX family.  The redesign features are as follows: 
 A version of the CFM Leap-1B turbofan with a fan diameter of 68 
inches (from 62 inches).  An extension of the nose gear by several 
inches (four to eight, depending on the source) and strengthening of 
the main landing gear enable installation of the new engine. (Molnar, 
2011; Boeing, 2012; Kingsley-Jones, 2010) 
 A fly-by-wire spoiler control system (to save weight). (Molnar, 2011) 
 A more aerodynamic design (especially at the tail cone) to reduce 
drag. (Molnar, 2011; Boeing, 2012) 
Boeing claims fuel use improvements over current 737s by 10–12%, and by 
7% over “tomorrow’s competition” (presumably the A320neo).  First deliveries are 
expected in 2017, with more than 1000 “orders and commitments from 15 
customers” (Boeing, 2012). 
The extent to which the 737MAX is a long-term solution or just a way to buy 
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F. Threats to “Bread and Butter”  
The 737 is Boeing’s “bread and butter,” in Boeing VP Piasecki’s words. The 
company needs the jet’s steady revenue stream to fund other projects, especially 
amid the three-year setback on the 787.  Boeing will decide “within the next several 
months” on what to do with both the 737 and the 777, which will be threatened by 
Airbus’s A350, Jim Albaugh, president of the company’s commercial airplanes unit, 
said at an American Bar Association conference on 27 October 2010  “I suspect 
Boeing will look to a 777 replacement first, rather than the still strong-selling 737,” 
said Doug Runte, managing director at Piper Jaffray & Co. in New York.  “If this thing 
is going gangbusters, and people love the airplane, and they can pump out 35 a 
month with their eyes closed, what’s the rush to re-engine or replace it?” Runte said. 
“I don’t see it” (Ray, 2010b). 
One industry observer sees increasing the size of the 737 as a possible 
Boeing strategy: 
Boeing and European rival Airbus SAS are weighing the merits of an upgrade 
for their best-selling planes after pushing back plans to develop new models, 
saying engine technologies aren’t ripe.  Boeing will decide by early next year 
and Airbus has promised a decision within two months.  Albaugh said adding 
capacity is an issue that Boeing is now studying for the 737 model. The 
“sweet spot” is for a plane able to carry 150 or more passengers, he said. 
Current 737s go from 110 to 190 seats, using either stretched or shrunken 
versions of a plane optimized for about 150 seats.  
While raising the seat count to a range of 150 to 220 would create a more 
efficient family of the 737, the move risks exposing a flank to makers of 
smaller planes.  They include Bombardier Inc.’s CSeries, which will seat 110 
to 145, or Brasil’s Embraer, which is studying a 130-seat plane.  Stretched 
aircraft have higher profit margins and sell better than shrunk versions, as the 
smaller jets are proportionally heavier. (Rothman, 2010, 12 October)  
The previous Boeing comment about “exposing a flank to makers of smaller 
planes” is significant.  The world’s two principal RJ makers, Bombardier of Canada 
and Embraer of Brazil, are developing models that exceed for the first time the 
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aircraft from mainline jets.  As stated by Jim Albaugh, president of Boeing 
Commercial Airplanes, unless 737 production is boosted, “we could lose customers 
to the [Bombardier] CSeries” (Drew & Mouawad, 2010; Wall, Norris, & Flottau, 
2010).21 In October 2010, Boeing took the interim step of offering an optional new 
intereion (Sky Interior) for the 737.  Key features include multicolored lighting, larger 
overhead bins, and increased headroom and natural light.  These interior changes 
are based largely on what will be standard features on the upcoming wide-body 
Boeing 787 (Sanders, 2010a). 
Both Boeing and Airbus depend on their narrow-bodies for stability, profit, and 
contribution to overhead costs.  The 737 and A320 are sold by the thousands, as 
discussed previously.  In comparison, larger wide-body jets are typically sold by the 
hundreds.  The wide-bodies also tend to have more variants and shorter production 
runs.  For example, the superjumbo Airbus A380 had received 234 orders as of 26 
October 2010 (Airbus, 2010b). 
The world’s two largest aircraft manufacturers do not wish to abandon the 
large-volume narrow-body segment to RJ makers.  At the same time, airlines and 
leasing firms do not wish to be caught empty-handed if there are delays in RJ 
deliveries and, as stated previously, would like Boeing in particular to keep 
improving the 737 (Cohen, 2010).  An additional factor is that a new generation of 
engines is in development to accompany the new RJs.  We will discuss the evolution 
of the RJ and its gradual growth into a competitor for mainline jets in the next 
sections. 
                                            
21 It is worth noting that the U.S. business jet manufacturers have not shown any inclination to 
compete in the RJ market.  Bombardier purchased the assets of bankrupt Learjet in 1990 and revived 
the firm as a subsidiary.  Cessna specializes in the smallest category of corporate jets. Gulfstream, 
the leader of the U.S. corporate jet industry, is a subsidiary of General Dynamics.  Perhaps these 
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G. Threat I: Regional Jets from 50 Seats to 150+ 
Our review of regional jets includes Canada’s Bombardier, which is the key 
challenger to Boeing and Airbus in the narrow-body market, as well as Brazil’s 
Embraer, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (which has absorbed Sukhoi and 
Irkut), and China’s Comac. 
Since passage of the (U.S.) Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, domestic 
passenger loads have continued a long-term increase due to increased competition, 
lower fares, and more frequent and convenient service to a larger number of 
destinations.  Similar measures undertaken by the European Union (EU) have 
allowed airlines registered anywhere in the EU to fly between any two points in the 
27 member states.  
Two trends associated with airline deregulation in the U.S. and EU, and more 
recently within the Asia-Pacific region, have been the rise of low-cost carriers (LCCs) 
and a shift of larger legacy carriers (such as United, British Airways, or Qantas) 
toward longer-haul flights using wide-body aircraft.  This shift makes sense given the 
higher cost structures of these legacy carriers. 
Fleet commonality has been an important tool for LCCs in their quests to 
keep costs and fares down. The LCCs face competition from the legacy carriers, rail 
service (particularly in Europe and the Northeastern U.S.), and each other.  
Southwest flies exclusively the 737, while the JetBlue’s and Ryanair22 fleets consist 
of the A320. Finally, LCCs tend to fly the newest aircraft possible in order to keep 
costs down, and the long production runs of the 737 and A320, combined with the 
effective absence of any competing mainline narrow-body aircraft, have made these 
two models extremely popular with LCCs.23 
                                            
22 Ryanair is the dominant European LCC. 
23 JetBlue’s 2005 acquisition of 100 of Embraer’s E190, which seats 100, is an indicator of RJs 
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1. First Move: The Canadair Regional Jet   
Bombardier introduced the first purpose-built regional jet into U.S. service in 
1993.  The CRJ-200 seats 50 passengers. As of June 2010, Bombardier had 
delivered 1,587 aircraft.  Initially, there was skepticism about this adaptation of the 
successful Canadair Challenger business jet into a market dominated by turboprops 
and mainline jets.  However, “the popularity of the type rose quickly.  The market has 
spoken” (Amoult, 2001). 
Despite the success of the CRJ-200, its thirst for fuel (on a per-passenger 
basis) made it highly volatile to fuel prices.  With close to 2,000 aircraft ordered and 
delivered, it had, by 2010, become expense to operate.  The CRJ-200 and its 
competitors made sense when oil was $20 a barrel and tarmac delays were not a 
concern.  Therefore, the majority of CRJ-200s have been withdrawn from service 
despite their short service life.  One factor in this mass retirement, also unforeseen, 
was that even legacy carriers have shifted away to some extent from preserving 
market share and hub dominance, and LCCs and other new entrant carriers are 
building a cost structure centered on point-to-point markets (Credeur & 
Schlangenstein, 2010). 
The market shifted quickly to larger RJs, and Bombardier responded in 2004 
with the CRJ-700, which seats about 70 passengers.  However, deliveries to date 
have been 303 aircraft – a disappointment to Bombardier.  The limits imposed by the 
Canadair Challenger fuselage had been reached, and a new type of RJ was needed 
to compete with whatever Boeing and Airbus were going to develop (Credeur & 
Schlangenstein, 2010; Jane’s, 2010d). 
Bombardier’s response had initially been a further fuselage lengthening: the 
CRJ-1000 (also known as the BRJ-X) carrying 90–110 passengers.  However, the 
                                                                                                                                       
of a second aircraft, the Boeing 717 (the ultimate version of the DC-9), to the Southwest fleet.  
Southwest management has not decided the fate of the 717, but adding a second aircraft to the fleet 
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Montreal firm’s management decided that a major investment was needed in a new 
kind of RJ, the CSeries (Jane’s, 2010a). 
2. Bombardier’s CSeries: A Major Gamble  
 Bombardier maintains that it can capture roughly half of the anticipated 6,300 
aircraft expected to be ordered over the next two decades in the 100–149-seat 
segment.  The aircraft promises 15% greater fuel efficiency and 20% operational 
cost savings over the mainline jets it will be replacing. Bombardier also claims that 
the aircraft will be four times quieter than comparable aircraft.  The aircraft’s range 
will be 1,800 to 2,950 nautical miles, equivalent to the aircraft currently operating in 
the 100–149- seat segment (Bombardier, 2010; Deveau, 2010).  
Bombardier announced the CSeries at Farnborough in 2004 but ceased 
development in 2006 because of perceived market conditions.  However, the firm 
relaunched the program in 2006 with a letter of interest from Lufthansa for 60 
aircraft.  Only two orders have followed, one from an Irish leasing firm and another 
for 40 planes from Republic Airways Holdings.  Entry into service is currently 
forecast for 2013 (Jane’s, 2010a; Deveau, 2010).  As stated by Fadi Chamoun of 
BMO Capital Markets: 
Our biggest concern with the aircraft is execution rather than being 
challenged by re-engineering an all-new clean sheet narrow-body aircraft 
from Boeing or Airbus.  The CSeries occupies a segment of the market that 
current narrow-body aircraft do not serve in an efficient manner,” Mr. 
Chamoun said in a note to clients. “In the immediate term, the aircraft’s 
success is judged by how it is received in the marketplace and its ability to 
sign up customers. (Deveau, 2010) 
Pierre Beaudoin, CEO of Bombardier, has emphasized that the CSeries 
(100–145 seats) is intended to compete with the A319 (125–145 passengers) rather 
than the A320 (150–180 seats).  Boeing 737 capacity varies by model and ranges 
from 110 to 215 passengers, with the most recent models in the 160-seat range.  
Beaudoin sees a fuel savings of 9% with the next-generation A319, while the 
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The CSeries represents a huge gamble for Bombardier, even with funding 
from the governments of Canada, the Province of Quebec, the Northern Island, and 
the UK.24  The potential impact of the aircraft has been described as follows:  
A verdict is still pending on the eventual commercial success of Bombardier's 
CSeries narrowbody.  But one thing is already clear—the aircraft has 
sounded the end of the Airbus-Boeing duopoly that has dominated the market 
for the past two decades. The CSeries' appearance could also give airlines 
greater pricing leverage over aircraft manufacturers. Airline executives have 
long complained about their low (or nonexistent) profit margins even as 
aircraft suppliers generate handsome returns. (Wall, 2010) 
Wing-mounted, twin-podded P&W Geared Turbofan (GTF) engines, swept 
low wings, and live telemetry of in-flight data25 are the key characteristics of the 
CSeries. Currently, the CSeries 110 and CSeries 130 are planned, with the model 
number indicating approximate passenger capacity (Bombardier, 2010; Jane’s, 
2010a; Deveau, 2010; Keenan, 2010).   
Bombardier’s expectation that the model will enter commercial service in 
2015 rests in great part on extensive outsourcing.  In the case of the CSeries, part of 
the time pressure came from the requirement, discussed above, to field a new type 
of aircraft before Airbus or Boeing can re-engine their existing narrow-bodies or 
deliver entirely new models.  The original production schedule and concept for the 
Boeing 787 featured greater outsourcing than had ever been the case for a medium-
size wide-body, leading to a breakdown of the supply chain, a period of chaos, and 
finally a reorganization of production that included bringing a great deal of work back 
in-house (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2008b).   
                                            
24 Shorts Brothers of Belfast is a Bombardier subsidiary. 
25 On June 1, 2009, Air France flight 447, an Airbus A330 en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, 
disappeared over the South Atlantic, with the tragic loss of 228 lives.  During a 40-minute period, the 
aircraft did not send any automated messages or respond to controller calls (Bureau d’Enquêtes et 
d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile, 2009).  This incident led to recommendations for 
continuous real-time communication from aircraft, whether for operational or forensic purposes 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 42 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The CSeries, while smaller than the 787, also features some highly innovative 
features that shift both production and development responsibility to suppliers. We 
previously discussed Bombardier’s decision to rely on the developmental Pratt & 
Whitney GTF engine.  Other major suppliers outside the U.S. and Canada include 
the following: 
 Empennage: Alenia Aeronautica, Italy 
 Landing gear: Liebherr Aerospace, Germany 
 Wings: Bombardier Shorts Brothers, Northern Ireland 
 Fuselage: Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), China 
The decision to outsource manufacturing of the entire fuselage26 to SAC is 
perhaps the riskiest one: 
The fuselages, plus tail cones and doors supplied by SAC, will make an even 
longer journey to Montreal than the wings. They will travel across the Pacific 
Ocean to Long Beach, Calif., then by truck to Montreal.  The choice of SAC to 
supply the fuselages has raised red flags with aerospace industry analysts. 
"There are many people you could have chosen to do the fuselage; 
Shenyang is not one of them," says Teal Group’s Mr. [Richard] Aboulafia, 
pointing to the company's lack of experience in building fuselages, a space 
where Japan-based Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Inc., Spirit AeroSystems Inc. of 
Wichita, Kan., and Italy-based Finmeccanica are established players. 
Shenyang is far from a new kid on the aerospace block - its website 
boasts a photo of Mao Zedong inspecting the cockpit of a new F5 fighter jet in 
1958 - but it’s new to the fuselage business.  The choice of SAC was a 
strategic move, designed in part to help the C Series penetrate the Chinese 
market.  China already accounts for about 40 per cent of Asia's air traffic and 
forecasts suggest it will represent 15 per cent of the world aviation market in 
15 to 20 years. Bombardier hopes that doing such major assembly in China 
will give it added sway with Chinese airlines. (Keenan, 2010) 
The fuselage outsourcing decision is emblematic of the globalization of the 
aerospace industry.  In this case, Bombardier avoided established suppliers (as well 
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as possible in-house production) and chose an inexperienced (and distant) Chinese 
source due to the expectation of eventual higher sales of the finished aircraft in 
China.  With so much at risk, the decision seems poorly considered, particularly 
given the difficulties initially faced in Boeing 787 production. 
3. Embraer: Not Necessarily a Competitor   
Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica) has emerged over the last 20 
years as one of the world’s principal aircraft manufacturers, with annual sales of 
about $1 billion.  The firm produces regional jets, business aircraft, and military 
trainers, tankers, and special mission aircraft.  Embraer’s current offerings include 
the E170/E190 series, with the E190 seating 114 passengers (Jane’s 2010c; 
Embraer, 2010). 
For the time being, Embraer has chosen to avoid competing directly with the 
mainline manufacturers.  The Brazilian firm will continue to develop its RJs (Jane’s, 
2010c; Wall, Norris, & Flottau, 2010).  In an interesting development, EADS (the 
parent company of Airbus) is exploring cooperation with Embraer, although EADS 
does not plan to inject any equity.  It may be that Embraer and Airbus decide to 
develop complementary, rather than competing, product lines.  Embraer is currently 
deciding whether to re-engine the E190 or begin development of a larger aircraft, 
competing directly with Airbus and Boeing.   
Embraer has also stated that it wants no part of the fight between its 
traditional rival, Bombardier, and Airbus/Boeing.  According to an Embraer 
representative, “We want to be complementary to the Airbus and Boeing fleets” and 
not competing with the two large firms (Sanders, 2010a; Flottau & Wall, 2010).  
Embraer’s interest in collaboration rather than competition recently became known 
on a related front.  Embraer is interested in technology exchange and sales with 
Europe related to its KC-390 tanker.  At this point, Embraer would appear to have 
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H. Threat II: China Enters the Race 
The entry of China into the global airliner market is a well-developed 
component of the Communist Party’s central planning, with an eye toward benefits 
for the People’s Liberation Army.  China’s strategy is described as follows: 
The government also realized that the renminbi’s inevitable appreciation 
would eventually render China’s low-tech exports uncompetitive, and that 
their manufacture would shift to countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. To keep its economy growing at around 9%, provide 
jobs for the next generation of better-educated workers, and boost income 
levels, the state had to ensure that Chinese companies develop, 
manufacture, and export advanced products. However, Chinese enterprises, 
such as the aircraft manufacturer Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC), the wind energy companies Sinovel and Goldwind, and the rail-
transport-equipment companies CSR and CNR, were unable to compete 
technologically with Western, Japanese, and South Korean market leaders. 
The Chinese government therefore developed a three-pronged plan to 
contain foreign companies and enable its companies to create advanced 
technologies. One, the state has ensured that it will be both buyer and seller 
in certain key industries, by retaining ownership of customers and suppliers 
alike. For instance, the Chinese government owns CSR and China Railways, 
AVIC and China Eastern Airlines. This gives the state a great deal of 
influence over equipment purchases, sales, and technology development. 
Two, the government has consolidated several manufacturers into a few 
national champions, to generate economies of scale and concentrate 
learning. CSR and AVIC both resulted from the mergers of several smaller, 
loss-making enterprises. 
Three, Chinese officials have learned to tackle multinational companies, 
often forcing them to form joint ventures with its national champions and 
transfer the latest technology in exchange for current and future business 
opportunities. Companies that resist are simply excluded from projects. The 
Chinese government uses the restrictions to drive wedges between foreign 
rivals vying to land big projects in the country and induce them to transfer the 
technologies that state-owned enterprises need to catch up. Executives 
working for multinational companies in China privately acknowledge that 
making official complaints or filing lawsuits usually does little good. (Hout & 
Ghermawat, 2010) 
China’s Comac remains a longer-term player with its development of the 
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technology to these long-standing aircraft at the time the C919 enters service.  The 
C919 is expected to have capacity of 168–190 passengers.  Bombardier has 
established a partnership with Comac to assist with development of the C919, which 
is larger than any anticipated variant of the CSeries (Larocque, 2010).  The aircraft is 
still at the mock-up stage, and China’s weak intellectual property protections remain 
a major barrier for western suppliers of systems.   
Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group, a noted airline analyst, has also 
expressed concern that the C919, if fielded, could ever have technology and 
performance similar to that of future versions of the 737 and A320 (Perrett, 2010a).  
Comac launched the C919 in 2008 without any orders.  The firm announced in 2010 
that orders and options for 100 aircraft had been received however: 
The first orders for the Comac C919 airliner total no more than 55, a 
surprisingly small figure that includes a mere five for each of China’s big state 
carriers.   
China Southern, Air China and China Eastern will also take options on 
only 15 each— suggesting an extraordinarily low degree of commitment to a 
project on which China is pinning its future as a commercial aircraft builder. 
In its announcement at the air show, Comac described the deals with all 
six customers as “orders,” leading to widespread news reporting of the 
inflated figure. (Perrett, 2010a) 
The C919 remains a developmental aircraft, although Comac claims the first 
deliveries will occur in 2016.  At the time of writing, the aircraft is about five tons 
overweight; industry observers view this as a surprise given China’s current state of 
technological expertise.  Also, much of Comac’s management and technical staff 
continue to grapple with the challenges of the firm’s ARJ-21  
In terms of national prestige, the Chinese quest to develop a mainline 
passenger  jet  is on a par in terms of national prestige with China’s space program 
(Perrett, 2010b).  However, little remains known about the C919’s support and 
distribution networks.  Industry observers agree on the significant growth potential of 
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placing an order for 102 Airbus products in November 2010 during a visit of the 
Chinese president to France (Page, 2010).  China’s poor record on the protection of 
intellectual property is a significant issue, particularly given dependence on Western 
suppliers. 
Nonetheless China is aiming to reshape the global aviation industry with a 
home-grown jetliner, a direct challenge to the supremacy of Boeing and Airbus, the 
world's only manufacturers of large commercial aircraft. 
The communist government has staked billions of dollars and national pride 
on the effort. What may surprise some Americans worried about slipping U.S. 
competitiveness is that some well-known U.S. companies are aiding China in 
its quest. 
That partnership will be on display next week at an air show in southern 
China with the unveiling of a full-scale mockup of the C919. Slated for 
production by 2016, the 156-seat, single-aisle passenger plane would have its 
fuselage emblazoned with Comac, short for the state-owned Commercial 
Aircraft Corp. of China. But inside, the most crucial systems would bear the 
trademarks of some of the biggest names in Western aviation. 
Honeywell International Inc. will supply power units, on-board computing 
systems, wheels and brakes; Rockwell Collins Inc. will handle navigation 
systems; GE Aviation is building the avionics; Eaton Corp. is involved with 
fuel and hydraulics; and Parker Aerospace of Irvine is responsible for flight 
controls. Powering the aircraft will be two fuel-efficient engines built by CFM 
International, a company co-owned by GE and French conglomerate Safran. 
Global supply chains are common in the aviation industry: Chicago-based 
Boeing and Europe's Airbus rely on parts makers and assembly operations 
around the world.  But China isn’t content just to buy sophisticated gear for 
the C919; the government has required foreign suppliers to set up joint 
ventures with Chinese companies. 
That has put U.S. and European suppliers in a tough spot: Be willing to 
hand over advanced technology to Chinese firms that could one day be rivals 
or miss out on what's likely to be the biggest aviation bonanza of the next half 
a century. Honeywell alone has snagged contracts worth more than $11 
billion for the project. 
You're faced with either being part of it or not,” said Billy Lay, a Dubai-
based partner at PRTM, an international consulting firm with expertise in 
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Roger Seager, GE Aviation's vice president and general manager for 
China, said he was confident that his company could protect its intellectual 
property. But the rapid rise of another Chinese transport industry — high-
speed rail — challenges that notion. After sharing technology and expertise to 
help China develop a network of gleaming bullet trains, Japanese and 
European rail firms now find themselves competing with their former Chinese 
joint-venture partners for new contracts, both inside and outside China. 
(Pierson, 2010) 
A related issue is the willingness (or legality) of foreign suppliers selling 
aviation technology to Comac, whose sister firms produce military aircraft.  While all 
the pieces are in place for development and production of a successful narrow-body 
aircraft, China’s resolve in dealing with technological challenges and intellectual 
property issues will be major factors in the C919’s success. 
I. Threat III (Maybe): Russian Pretensions 
There are two Russian aircraft competing for the narrow-body airliner market: 
the Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SSJ-100) and the Irkut MS-21 (also referred to as the MC-
21).  We deal with each in turn.   
It is difficult to assess any information on the Russian aerospace industry due 
to the country’s system of government, which has developed (arguably) into a joint 
venture between kleptocratic elements (featuring a strong role for organized crime) 
and the neo-Soviet organs of state security.  Russian aerospace firms are also a 
morass of inter-related companies, all of whom are involved in defense systems and 
all of whom have the backing of the state in some form.  Together with a collapsing 
public sector mired in problems such as declining life expectancy, a highly polluted 
and often radioactive environment, and rampant alcoholism, any information 
released about successes of the SSJ-100 and MC-21 has been intentionally 
sketchy.  Both aircraft, however, are twin-engine jets intended to compete with the 
A320 family and the Boeing 737, at least at the lower end of passenger capacity for 
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Superjet International manufactures the SSJ-100.  The firm is a joint venture 
between Alenia Aeronautica of Italy (51%, unspecified as to the meaning of the 
number) and Sukhoi Holding Company for the balance.  Superjet is headquartered 
in Venice, undoubtedly presenting a much more pleasant impression than the 
location of the main assembly plant in Komsolmosk-on-Amur in Novosibirsk.  
Subsequently, the state carried out a consolidation of the Russian aerospace 
industry, with Sukhoi becoming part of the United Aircraft Corporation (Superjet 
International, 2010; Aerospace Technology, 2010; Sukhoi, 2010; ITAR-TASS, 2010). 
Depending on the variant, the SSJ-100 seats between 78 and 105 
passengers.  The twin power plants are joint ventures of France’s Snecma and 
Russia’s Saturn Aerospace, designated as the Powerjet SaM146 turbofan.  
Maximum range of the aircraft (a SSJ-75LR variant) is 2,456 nautical miles.  The 
prototype was rolled out in 2007, and the first flight was at an unspecified date in 
2010 (RIA Novosti, 2010).  ITAR-TASS assures that deliveries will begin before the 
end of 2010.  Additionally, all aircraft will satisfy “Russian and international 
requirements” according to TASS, but the term “certification” is lacking in any Sukhoi 
or Russian material (ITAR-TASS, 2010; Sukhoi, 2010).   
However, Sukhoi has obtained type certification for the engines from the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), although there is no forecast certification 
date for the aircraft itself. (Kingsley-Jones & Komarov, 2010)  Jane’s, in its typically 
cautious manner, can attest to only 122 orders  (Jane’s, 2010g; Sukhoi, 2010). 
Aeroflot, forced by the Russian state into the position of launch customer, is 
expecting first deliveries at the end of 2010.  However, the airline has declined to 
include the SSJ-100 in its timetables, citing repeated program delays.  The aircraft is 
over two years late, due to development problems with the engine and a variety of 
unspecified challenges with the other parts of the aircraft (Kingsley-Jones, 2010). 
In addition to Snecma (described as a partner to Sukhoi) and Boeing 
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participating in the Superjet project, including Thales (avionics), Messier Dowty 
(landing gear), BAE (interior), Honeywell (auxiliary power unit), Hamilton Sunstrand 
(electrical system), Goodrich (wheels and brakes) (Sukhoi, 2010; Jane’s, 2010g).  
Whatever the failings of the Russian Federation, Western firms do not seem to 
perceive a risk in doing business with a country characterized by ambiguous politics 
and a military that is beginning to grow and modernize. 
The second Russian aircraft that is in competition for the narrow-body market 
is the Irkut MS-21.  Irkut has also become a component of United Aircraft 
Corporation (UAC).  The MS-21’s development is a few years behind the Superjet, 
with its first flight due in 2014 and service entry in 2016.  Capacity, depending on 
variant, is 150 to 215 passengers, clearly matching the A320 and 737.  The aircraft 
will replace the Soviet-era Tu-154, which is inefficient and arguably unsafe.  Irkut 
plans MS-21 certification by the Federal Aviation Administration and EASA (Jane’s, 
2010f). 
The MS-21 will feature the P&W Geared Turbofan engine and a composite 
wing.  Irkut accepts the fact that there will be a requirement for after-sales support, a 
major weakness of Russian aircraft.  Once again, Aeroflot will be the launch 
customer. The following article summarizes the project’s status: 
The 150-210-seat, three-model MS-21 family is being developed by Irkut 
under the umbrella of United Aircraft Corp. (UAC). Development is expected 
to cost 190 billion rubles ($6.3 billion) through 2016 when it is due to enter 
service; 40% is being funded by the Russian federal budget, with the 
remainder coming from loans and UAC’s investment. 
Total commitments for the twinjet stand at 190, and the most recent 
addition is a letter of intent for 50 from Russian state holding company 
Rostekhnologii. “These are due for delivery between 2016 and 2020, and we 
are fairly sure they will go to Aeroflot,” Budaev says. 
Irkut is negotiating with airlines in Europe and North America about order, 
and is also looking to link up with a Western company to provide international 
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The MS-21’s key design points include Pratt & Whitney’s PW1000G 
geared turbofan (GTF) as lead powerplant and a carbon-fiber wing. The MS-
21’s GTF would be similar to the version that would be developed for Airbus’s 
proposed A320 New Engine Option upgrade, says Budaev. 
Current plans call for the MS-21’s GTF to have a baseline thrust of 35,000 
lb. and a fan diameter of roughly 80 in. Evolved from the lower-powered GTFs 
in development for Bombardier’s CSeries and the Mitsubishi Regional Jet, the 
MS-21’s engine may incorporate some material changes and different gear 
ratio. (Kingsley-Jones & Komarov, 2010) 
UAC forecasts a global market for 1200 MS-21a over 25 years, of which 300 
would be for the domestic market.  This would correspond to 10% of the global 
demand for aircraft in the 150–220 seat range (“Russia’s Aerospace Revival,” 2010).  
Given the factors already cited with respect to the Superjet 100, the addition of a 
composite wing leads to some genuine skepticism, particularly at a time when 
Boeing, with outstanding engineering capabilities, finds itself grappling with 
implementation of a composite wing on the 787 (Mecham & Wall, 2010). 
J. Perspectives on the Narrow-Body Market 
1. Assessing the Threats   
The aging A320 and Boeing 737 present an opportunity for market entry by 
new manufacturers into what has been an effective duopoly in the worldwide 
manufacture of mainline passenger jets since the absorption of McDonnell Douglas 
by Boeing in 1996. 
All of the presumed new entrants—Bombardier, Comac, Embraer, Irkut, and 
Sukhoi— claim major advantages for their products over the two ubiquitous narrow-
bodies that have sold over 7,000 shipsets.  The new players consistently mention 
capital and operating costs, fuel efficiency, emissions, turnaround time, range, and 
commonality within variants as reasons to leave the duopoly and try out something 
new.   
Boeing executives, in a predictable but legitimate view, consider the in-
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evolution of the Boeing 737 fuselage, coupled with what may be the ultimate version 
of the CFM56, will save operators about $120,000 a year over current 737s.  Finally, 
fleet commonality and technical support are not even issues when buying Boeing 
aircraft (“Boeing Skeptical,” 2010). 
The naïveté of some of the new entrants is surprising, particularly given the 
billions involved in developing any new aircraft.  China may represent the largest 
emerging aviation market the world has ever seen but cannot demonstrate adequate 
intellectual property protection.  The People’s Liberation Army stands at the center of 
the Chinese state and would certainly acquire any useful foreign technologies for its 
rapidly growing desire for global power projection. 
The most surprising result of our research is the lack of disclosure, or simply 
the outright absence, of the worldwide distribution and technical support networks 
that are necessary to support both aircraft and engines.  A recent survey of airlines 
by CFM International indicated that fuel efficiency ranked fifth, with reliability a clear 
number one, in the decision to purchase a new airliner (Cohen, 2010).  Only Airbus, 
Boeing, Bombardier, and Embraer have established the global infrastructure that is 
required to complement a very high degree of in-flight reliability. 
As we discussed, Embraer currently appears to be pursuing a cautious 
course toward possible cooperation with European firms such as EADS and 
Dassault and will not enter the above-100-seat market.  Embraer’s interests in 
technology sharing and collaborative marketing, particularly with respect to its KC-
390 tanker, confirm this direction. 
That leaves only Bombardier’s CSeries as a viable new entrant that can 
compete directly with the lower end (in passenger capacity) of the A320 and Boeing 
737 families.  Bombardier’s ambitious manufacturing plan and somewhat 
adventurous worldwide supply chain, highlighted by production of the main fuselage 
in China, point to a high-risk project.  In the case of the Boeing 787, outsourcing of 
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Boeing was able to recover, in part by purchasing the Vought Aircraft facility in 
Charleston, SC, where the aerospace giant is now opening a nearby second 
assembly plant for the 787 (Sanders, 2009). 
Bombardier is a diversified and smaller firm that may not necessarily have the 
ability to either manage the CSeries project or recover from a major supply chain 
problem in its manufacturing process.  The decision to outsource the manufacturing 
of the fuselage barrel outside North America may be a major success in supply 
chain management, or it could virtually shut down the Montreal-based firm.  The 
prospect of increased Chinese sales, in our view, is far too theoretical and distant to 
warrant such a risky decision, whatever the merits.   
In conclusion, the only viable competitor to Airbus and Boeing (with Embraer 
having opted out) may find itself pulling back from a very expensive experiment.  
Has Bombardier really absorbed the significant and expensive lessons learned from 
the initial manufacturing concept for the Boeing 787? 
2. The Narrow-Body Airliner as a Contestable Market   
What is going on with the Boeing/Airbus duopoly in narrow-body airliners is 
largely explainable using a branch of microeconomics called contestable market 
theory.  The generally acknowledged seminal work in this area is Baumol’s 
Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (Baumol et al., 1982).   
While the Baumol exposition is quite sophisticated, the central idea is pretty 
simple.  Markets that appear to have few (or one) firms competing may have 
potential entrants lurking about.  The effect is to make the current (incumbent) firms 
behave more like competitive firms than appearances would indicate.  (An Internet 
site states this idea rather well: “a market in which there are only a few companies 
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Going a little bit deeper, a market is said to be “perfectly contestable” if the 
potential entrants could enter that market and exit without incurring any (non-
recoverable) costs, or “costlessly reversible entry” (Bailey, 1982, p. xix).  (It’s worth 
noting that entry and exit are both important.)  More generally, markets can have 
degrees of contestability, which increases as costs of entry and exit decrease. 
In that context, the regional jet companies (such as Bombardier) have 
observed that the narrow-body airliner market now dominated by Airbus and Boeing 
is very profitable.  Furthermore, having the option to do that is sufficiently valuable 
that the potential entrants have developed variations of their regional jets that are 
much closer substitutes for the Boeing 737 and Airbus 320 families.   
But, with the apparent exception of the Chinese Comac C919 (which is 
comparable in size to the A320), the potential entrants have trimmed their costs and 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
This report has focused on the EADS-Boeing rivalry.  We’ve considered one 
of its major manifestations in the defense market—the multiple KC-X source 
selection episodes.  The KC-X is significant for a number of reasons.  First, it is one 
of the major defense manifestations of a rather heated international rivalry in pursuit 
of both commercial and defense business.  Another is the extensive interconnection 
between commercial and defense aerospace markets (for aerial tankers in this 
case).   
At the same time, the Boeing (737) and Airbus (A320) narrow-body airliner 
families are (a) a key part of the overall Boeing-EADS competition and (b) major 
profit centers for both firms.  As one would expect, prospects of profits have 
attracted a number of firms, who are actively working on market entry strategies.  
The approaches involved include upsizing regional jet designs (e.g., Bombardier of 
Canada) and new airframe designs (e.g., Comac of China) intended to compete 
directly with the incumbents (Airbus A320 and Boeing 737).  In short, the narrow-
body airliner market is becoming contestable. 
Both Boeing and Airbus (as incumbents) have developed counters to their 
potential competitors: the A320neo (new engine option) and the B737 MAX (also 
with a new engine).  Both aircraft are already commercial successes (each with 
more than 1,000 orders or commitments).  However, their ultimate degree of 
success in keeping potential new competitors out of this lucrative market remains to 
be seen. 
In any case, this situation has potential to affect the global aerospace market 
in major ways.  If (despite the difficulties), one or more potential entrant becomes a 
major player, then the narrow-body airliner market will become more competitive – 
and less profitable.  With lessened profits from the A320 and 737 product lines, 
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We’ve also offered explanatory models for the developments we’ve 
discussed.  The microeconomic theory of contestable markets turns out to be highly 
useful in explaining developments in the market for narrow-body airliners.  For the 
third (and presumably successful) attempt to select a new aerial tanker (KC-X) for 
the U.S. Air Force, the picture is more varied.  We used Allison’s three models as 
candidates for explanation.  Model I (unitary rational actor) is highly useful in 
explaining Boeing’s rather low final bid—particularly as operationalized in the form of 
business case analysis.   
There is more variety in the useful perspectives regarding the Air Force’s 
selection of the Boeing KC-46: changing circumstances, changing selection criteria, 
and politics.  The “politics” hypothesis lays out pretty much within Allison’s Model III 
(governmental politics).  The “changing circumstances” hypothesis predicts a 
changed aerial tanker selection as a result of a changed airlift force structure 
(principally through increased numbers of C-17s available); this fits well with Model I 
(rational actor).  Finally, the “changing selection criteria” hypothesis can originate 
from any one of Allison’s models.  Model I applies if the rule changes are related to 
changing circumstances (such as more C-17s).  Model II (bureaucratic process) or a 
variant is useful in explaining the Air Force acquisition establishment’s effort to 
develop protest-resistant source selection processes.  Finally, the politics hypothesis 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 57- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References 
Aerospace Technology. (2010). Sukhoi Superjet 100 Russian Regional Jet (RRJ), 
Russia. Retrieved from http://www.aerospace-technology.com 
Agence France-Presse (AFP). (2011, 1 February 1). Boeing to revise bid for U.S. 
military tanker deal. DefenseNews. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5593186&c=AME 
Agence France-Presse (AFP). (2011, 26 February). Tanker victory spells risks for 
Boeing. DefenseNews. Retrieved from  
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5812841&c=AME&s=AIR 
Agence France-Presse (AFP). (2012, 29 February). Schwartz calls cancelled aircraft 




AFA (Air Force Association, 2012, 5 January),  Light air support work placed on 
hold.  Retrieved from http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2012/January%202012/January%2005%20
2012/LightAirSupportWorkPlacedonHold.aspx 
Airbus. (2012a). A320 family. Retrieved from http://www.airbus.com 
Airbus. (2012b). A380 family. Retrieved from http://www.airbus.com Airbus. 25 
January.. 
 Airbus A320neo family. (2012). In Wikipedia. Retrieved March 2012 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A320neo 
Airbus A330. (2012). In Wikipedia. Retrieved March 2012 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A330 
Airbus Military, A330 MRTT. (n.d.). Retrieved from  
http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/military-aircraft/a330-mrtt/ 
Airbus v Boeing. (2010, 30 September). The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://economist.com 
Allison, G. (1971), Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,  
Boston, MA: Little Brown. 
Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 58- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Amoult, S. (2001, May). Pardon our dust! Air Transport World, 38(5), 66–69. 
ASC (Aeronautical Systems Command, 2010, 24 February), (KC-X) Request for 
Proposal, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, FA8625-10-R-6600. 
Bailey, E. (1982). Introduction. In W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, & R. D. Willig, 
Contestable markets and the theory of industry structure. New York, NY: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
Baumol, W. J., J. C. Panzar, & R. D. Willig, Contestable markets and the theory of 
industry structure. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
Belote, R. (2008, 18 February). Northrop Grumman KC-30 tanker is 20 percent more 
capable according to US Air Force evaluation model. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/02/mil-080218-
northrop-grumman03.htm 
Bennett, J. T. (2011, 23 January). Air Force tanker decision likely delayed by Senate 
hearing. The Hill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/news-by-subject/defense-
homeland-security/139559-air-force-tanker-decision-likely-delayed-by-senate-
hearing 
Boeing. (n.d.a). 707 family. Retrieved from 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/707family/index.html 
Boeing. (n.d.b). About the 737 family. Retrieved from 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/background.html 
Boeing. (n.d.c). DC-9 family. Retrieved from http://www.boeing.com/commercial/dc-
9/index.html 
Boeing. (n.d.d). Integrated fleet aerial refueling assessment White Paper [White 
paper]. Retrieved from http://www.scribd.com/doc/3665249/IFARA-Tanker-
White-Paper 
Boeing. (n.d.e.). Jet prices. Retrieved from 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/prices/ 
Boeing. (2011, 24 February). Boeing receives US Air Force contract to build next-
generation refueling tanker [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://Boeing.Mediaroom.Com/Index.Php?S=43&Item=1638 
Boeing. (2012, 12 February). Boeing to begin final phase of 737 MAX wind tunnel 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 59- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Boeing 737 MAX. (2012). In Wikipedia. Retrieved March 2012 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/737_MAX 
Boeing 767. (2012). In Wikipedia. Retrieved March 2012 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_767  
Boeing skeptical of CSeries, C919, MS-21 EIS [Web log message]. (2010, October 
28). Leeham News and Comment. Retrieved from 
http://leehamnews.wordpress.com     XXXX 
Bombardier. (2010). CSeries family. Retrieved from http://cseries.com/en/ 
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile. (2009, Juillet). 
Rapport d’étape: Accident survenu le 1er juin 2009 à l’Airbus A330-203 
immatriculé F-GZCP exploité par Air France: vol. AF 447 Rio de Janeiro – 
Paris. Retrieved from http://www.bea.aero 






Butler, A. (2011, 7 March). EADS KC-X price exceeded Boeing by 10 percent. 





Butler, A. (2011, 11 April). Pentagon gives first peek into KC-46A details. Aviation 
Week. Retrieved from 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/asd/2011/04/08/0
1.xml&channel=defense 




Butler, A. (2011, 19 September). USAF takes conservative approach to developing, 
buying future weapons. Aviation Week, p. 66.  









Butler, A., & Warwick, G. (2012, 5 March). Acquisition awry. Aviation Week, p. 35. 
Capaccio, T. (2011, 28 November). Boeing's cost ceiling may go over $500 million 
for tankers. Washington Post, p. 13. 
Censer, M. (2011, 13 March). Now 'good enough' wins the defense contract. 
Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/13/AR2011031304386.html 
Cohen, A. (2010, 16 October). Boeing upgrades aim to cut 737 fuel use by 2 percent 
[Web log message]. Retrieved from 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/226223.asp 
Credeur, M. J., & Schlangenstein, M. (2010, 13 September). Tiny regional jets fly 
toward the scrap heap. Bloomberg Businessweek, 26. 
Cseries to be first for ‘live black box.’ (2010, 7 September). Flight International. 
Available  from LexisNexis Academic database. 
Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR). (2011, 30 
September). Selected acquisition report, KC-46, RCS: DD-A&T(Q&A)823-387, 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Defense Industry Daily (DID). (2011, 7 March). The USAF’s KC-X aerial tanker RFP. 
Retrieved from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usafs-kcx-aerial-
tanker-rfp-03009/ 
Deveau, S. (2010, 17). Stakes are high for Bombardier’s CSeries. The Gazette 
(Montreal). Retrieved from http://www.montrealgazette.com 
Director of Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E). (2011 December). KC-46A. 
In FY11 annual report (pp. 237–238). Retrieved from 
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2011/ 
 Department of Defense (2010), Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 
(unclassified Executive Summary), Washington, D.C., 26 February).   
Drew, C. (2010, 1 December). Air Force acts to fix error in tanker bid. New York 
Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/business/advertisingemail/01tanker.html?
src=busln&scp=5&sq=Christopher%20Drew&st=cse 
Drew, C. (2011, 24 February 24). Boeing wins contract to build Air Force tankers. 








Drew, C. (2011, 25 February). Air Force’s shifting rules helped Boeing. New York 
Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/business/global/26tanker.html?ref=christ
opherdrew 
Drew, C., & Mouawad, J. (2010, 16 November). Boeing and Airbus waver on 
reworking their smaller jets. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com 
Embraer. (2010). The company. Retrieved from http://embraer.com 
Eshel, N. (2010). IAI's B767-based multi-mission tanker transport demonstrates 





Flottau, J., & Wall, R. (2010, 14 June). Alliance revisited. Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 172(23), 36.  
Franck, R. (2012). Business case analysis in the defense sector [Unpublished 
manuscript]. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Franck, R., Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2008a). Echoes across the pond: Understanding 
EU-US defense industrial relationships (NPS-AM-08-001).  Retrieved from 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net/files/FY2008/NSP-AM-08-002.pdf 
Franck, R, Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2008b). New patterns of collaboration and rivalry in 
the US and European defense and aerospace industries (NPS-AM-08-131). .  
Retrieved from http://www.acquisitionresearch.net/files/FY2008/NPS-AM-08-
131.pdf 
Franck, R., Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2010). Global cooperation and competition in the 
defense and aerospace industries (NPS-AM-10-005). .  Retrieved from 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net/files/FY2010/NPS-AM-10-005.pdf 
Franck, R., Lewis, I., Matthews, D., & Udis, B. (2011). Emerging patterns in the 
global defense industry (NPS-AM-11-001). Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Retrieved from 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net/files/FY2011/NPS-AM-11-001.pdf. 
Fulghum, D. A. (2010, 20 October). Additional fuel may pay off in tanker competition. 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 62- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Gates, D. (2010, 7 December). Analyst: Boeing's hopes fading for tanker win. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2013612153_tank
er07.html 
Gertler, J. (2010), Air Force KC-X tanker aircraft program: Background and issues 
for Congress (FL34398). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2011, 22 December). Matter of: Hawker 
Beechcraft Defense Company, LLC, File: B-406170. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587328.pdf 
Haskin, T. (2004, 8 July). The might-have-beens: Convair 880 and 990. Retrieved 
from http://www.airliners.net 
Hout, T. M., & Ghermawat, P. (2010). China vs. the world: Whose technology is it? 
Harvard Business Review. December, Retrieved from 
http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu 
Hawker Beechcraft. (2011, 22 November). Hawker Beechcraft requests review of 
U.S. Air Force light air support contract bidding process after U.S. Air Force 




Hawker Beechcraft. (2011, 27 December). Hawker Beechcraft to file suit with Court 
of Federal Claims on U.S. Air Force light air support contract bidding process 




Hegeman, R. (2012, 28 February). Air Force investigating disputed plane contract. 
Boston Globe. Retrieved from 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2012/02/28/air_force_investigatin
g_disputed_plane_contract/ 
Hepher, T., & Shalal-Esa, A. (2011, 25 February). Analysis: EADS unlikely to protest 
tanker defeat. Retrieved 
fromhttp://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE71O4XP20110225?ca=rdt   
Hodge, N. (2012, 29 February). Air Force sets aside plane contract. Wall Street 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 63- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Hotakainen, R. (2011, 25 February). How one lawmaker steered tanker contract to 
Boeing. McClatchy.  Retrieved from 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/25/109469/how-one-lawmaker-steered-
tanker.html 
International Aero Engines. (2010). About us. Retrieved from http://www/i-a-e.com 
Investopedia (2012), Contestable market theory, Retrieved 17 February 27 from 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/contestablemarket.asp#ixzz1nbb3XpRr 
ITAR-TASS. (2010, 27 October). Ivanov confirms first Superjet-100 plane supplies 
will begin before yearend [Newswire release]. Available from LexisNexis 
Academic database. 
Jane’s. (1991–1992). Boeing model 727 (United States). Jane’s All the World’s 
Aircraft. Retrieved from http://janes.com 
Jane’s. (2010a, March 2). Bombardier CSeries. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. 
Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
Jane’s. (2010b). Embraer ERJ-145, 170, 190 and Lineage 1000. Jane’s All the 
World’s Aircraft. Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
Jane’s. (2010c). Airbus A320. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. Retrieved from 
http://www.janes.com 
Jane’s. (2010d). Bombardier CRJ200 and CRJ700. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. 
Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
Jane’s. (2010). Boeing 737. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. Retrieved from 
http://www.janes.com 
Jane’s. (2010f). IRKUT MS-21. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. Retrieved from 
http://www.janes.com 
Jane’s. (2010). Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SSJ-100). Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. 
Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
JetBlue. (2010). Embraer E190. Retrieved from http://jetblue.com 
Keenan, S. (2010, 2 October). A new machine. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), pp. 
B6–B9. 
Kingsley-Jones, M., Compart, A., & Flottau, J. (2010, October 4). Re-engining 
decision time. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 172(36), 45. Available  




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 64- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Kingsley-Jones, M., & Komarov, A. (2010, 6 September). Russian revival. 
Aerospace Week & Space Technology, 172(33), 40.  
Larocque, S. (2010, 29 Octobre). Bombardier: La CSeries sera-t-elle prête à temps? 
La Presse (Montreal). Retrieved from http://lapresseaffaires.cyberpresse.ca 
Lynn, W. J., Carter, A. B., & Donley, M. (2009, September 24). Moving forward. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/briefingslide.asx?briefingslideid=340   
Mecham, M., & Wall, R. (2010, 22 November). Boeing 787 ice protection may pave 
way for new structural applications. Aviation Week & Space Technology., 45.  
Mecham, M., & Norris, G. (2012, 13 February). A shim in time. Aviation Week, p. 32. 
M.J.S. (2011, 25 February). Home-team advantage pays off for Boeing [Web log 
post]. The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/clausewitz/2011/02/americas_air-
tanker_order?fsrc=nwl 
Majumdar, D. (2011, 24 February). DoD: Tanker decision protest-proof. Aviation 
Week. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5800133&c=AME&s=TOP 
Majumdar, D. (2011, 17 March). USAF to tightly control tanker requirements 
changes. DefenseNews. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5989328&c=AME&s=AIR 
Majumdar, D. (2011c, 13 October). KC-46: Model program, yet potential delays 
exist. DefenseNews. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7947746&c=AME&s=AIR 
Majumdar, D., & Weisgerber, M. (2012, 19 January). U.S. Air Force disputes testers 
on KC-46 tanker. DefenseNews. Retrieved 
fromhttp://www.defensenews.com/article/20120119/DEFREG02/301190017 
Maxon, T. (2010) Quick resolutions expected to hurdles in Southwest Airlines-
AirTran deal, The Dallas Morning News, 29 September, retrieved from 
http://222.dallasnews.com. 
Molnar, M. (2011, November). Boeing 737 MAX will feature larger engines, longer 
landing gear, fly-by-wire spoilers. Retrieved from 
http://www.nycaviation.com/2011/11/boeing-announces-new-737-max-
engine-and-order-details/ 
Muradian, V. (2010, 19 November). USAF gaffe roils tanker contest. DefenseNews. 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 65- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Muradian, V., & Reed, J. (2010, 16 May). Boeing source: We may not bid for KC-
X.Air Force Times. Retrieved from http://www.airforcetimes.comNorris, G., 
Wall, R., & Anselmo, J. C. (2010, August 26). Airbus and Boeing poised for 
potential divide over reengining. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
172(32), 32–33, 35. 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs; OASD[PA]). (2011, 24 
February). DOD news briefing with Deputy Secretary Lynn and DOD senior 
leaders to announce the Air Force KC-46A tanker contract award [News 
transcript].  Retrieved from 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4776 
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs; OASD[PA]). (2011, 30 
December). Contracts: Missile Defense Agency [Contract].  Retrieved from 
http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4695 
Page, J. (2010, 15 November). China wins jet orders in bid to battle big rivals. Wall 
Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com 
Perrett, B. (2010, 13 September). C919 will be designed for prolonged 
competitiveness, says Avic. Aviation Week & Space Technology. Retrieved 
from http://aviationweek.com 
Perrett, B. (2010, 22 November). Few orders, weight problems hampering C919. 
Aviation Week & Space Technology. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com 
Pierson, D. (2010, 13 November). China to unveil its own large jetliner. Los Angeles 
Times. Retrieved from http://latimes.com 
Pratt & Whitney. (2010). Classic engines: JT3D (TF33). Retrieved from 
http://www.pratt-whitney.com 
Ray, S. (2010). Boeing may win in 2010 orders on 737 as Airbus waffles on A320. 
Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com 
Reed, J. (2009, 15 December). Sessions: Northrop threat has Congress uncertain. 
DefenseNews. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4421294&c=AME 
Re-engine no-go? (2010, 6 September). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
172(33). Retrieved from http://www.aviationweek.com 
RIA Novosti. (2010, 4 November). First commercial Sukhoi Superjet 100 makes 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J 66- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Rothman, A. (2010, 12 October). Jet-leasing ‘godfather’ Udvar-Hazy clashes with 
Airbus on A320. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com 
Rothman, A. (2010, 21 October). Boeing favors all-new 737 with more seats to 
reduce emissions. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com 
Rothman, A. (2010, 17 December). Airbus works on final U.S. Air Force tanker bid, 
claiming edge on Boeing. Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-17/airbus-works-on-tanker-bid-with-
plane-boeing-says-is-oversized-.html 
Russia’s aerospace revival [Blog post]. (2010, 1 November). Retrieved from 
http://www.asianaviation.com 
Sanders, P. (2009, 8 July). Boeing sets deal to buy a Dreamliner plant—Company to 
pay Vought Aircraft $580 million, forgive cash advances for work on 787. The 
Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com 
Sanders, P. (2010, 9 September). Embraer to decide future of commercial jet 
program. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com  
Sanders, P. (2010, 29 October). Boeing’s 737 gets new look. The Wall Street 
Journal. Retrieved from http://wsj.com 
Schwartz, N. (2011, 2 March). Remarks for Defense Programs Conference [Media 
release]. Retrieved from http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
110302-044.pdf 
Scully, M. (2010, 22 November). EADS: Mistaken data release won't scuttle tanker 
contest. Retrieved from 
http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=46575&dcn=e_gvet  
Siebold, S. (2011, 5 February). EADS will not improve U.S. tanker. Retrieved from  
https://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-airbus-interview-
idUSTRE714O32011205   
Sirak, M. C. (2011, 17 October). New tanker update. Retrieved from 
http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/Features/modernization/Pages/box101711tanker.aspx  
Smith, R. (1998). 75 years of inflight refueling. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
Smith, V. (2011, 16 February). EADS cuts price on US tanker bid. Agence France-









Sukhoi. (2010). Sukhoi Superjet 100. Retrieved from http://www.sukhoi.org 
Superjet International. (2010). Profile. Retrieved from 
http://www.superjetinternational.com 
Thompson, L. B. (2011, 28  February). Tanker wars: Why Boeing won. Industry 
Week. Retrieved from 
http://www.industryweek.com/articles/tanker_wars_why_boeing_won_23997.
aspx?Page=2 
Tiron, R. (2010, 12 October). Air Force chief: Tanker process won’t be rushed. The 
Hill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/123895-air-force-
chief-tanker-process-wont-be-rushed 
Trimble, S. (2010, 2 February). Singapore 2010: IAI unveils plans to convert used 
767s into tanker-transports. FlightGlobal. Retrieved from 
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/singapore-2010-iai-unveils-plans-to-
convert-used-767s-into-337941/ 
Wall, R. (2010, 19 July). Game changer. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
172(27), 121. 
Wall, R., Norris, G., & Flottau, J. (2010, 26 July). Leasing companies give Airbus, 
Boeing reason to increase output. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
172(28), 32–33. 
Warwick, G. (2010, 7 September). France and Brazil in Rafale for KC-390 deal? 
[Web log post]. Aviation Week. Retrieved from 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/ 
Weisgerber, M. (2011, 4 March). EADS won't protest USAF tanker pick. Defense 
News. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5868798&c=EUR 
Weisgerber, M. (2012, 27 February). USAF vows to minimize acquisition ‘Hiccups.’ 
Defense News, p. 20. 
Wilhelm, S. (2011, 28 November). Boeing spokesman insists Air Force tanker will 






















2003 - 2012 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 







 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-term Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 






 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.net 
